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ABSTRACT
Community Development Venture Capital (CDVC) is emerging as a new
mechanism to infuse underserved businesses and entrepreneurs with equity
capital. Community Development Venture Capital attempts to link private sector
models of capital generation with socially motivated outcomes, namely job
creation for low-income workers, while establishing an alternative model to
investing in business. This thesis investigates the burgeoning urban CDVC
industry through case studies of three organizations, Silicon Valley Community
Ventures, Boston Community Venture Fund and Murex Investments. These brief
studies focus on two issues: the relationship between Fund investors and Fund
investments, and the social impact measures of the Fund's investments. The
analysis centers primarily on the changes between the CDVC's first and second
Funds to understand the changes occurring in the industry and explore the
potential ramifications of these industry shifts. This thesis argues two main
points. First, investors in CDVC Funds have influence over the type of
investments CDVC Funds make, but these influences have not been examined
as they relate to the overall social impact that changes in investment patterns
may have on the CDVC industry. Potentially, the changing nature of CDVC
investors has a considerable effect on the nature and impact of social returns on
investments. Second, the overall measurement of the social impact of CDVC's
has not been developed or implemented in a rigorous or systematic fashion.
This lack of social impact measurement is detrimental to the industry. To ensure
that CDVC's live up to the philosophy of the double bottom line, the attention to
measuring the social returns on investment must be increased and more
comprehensive. The direction of Funds toward this more comprehensive
approach to measurement will position Funds to align their investors with their
outcomes; ultimately creating a system of similar effectiveness to the traditional
Venture Capital. In traditional Venture Capital, motivations are aligned to provide
the highest financial returns possible. When CDVCs are able to articulate and
document the full range of their impact, financial and social, they too will be able
to align their motivations with investors who understand and support both inputs
in the double bottom line.
Thesis Advisor: Karl Seidman
Lecturer, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
Thesis Reader: Ceasar McDowell
Director, Center for Community Reflective Practice
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Introduction
Community Development Venture Capital (CDVC) is emerging as a new
mechanism to infuse underserved businesses and entrepreneurs with equity
capital. It distinguishes itself from the traditional Venture Capital (VC) industry by
pursuing the double bottom line approach to investing, focused both on the
financial returns and social returns of its investments. It further distinguishes
itself from public sponsored Venture Capital (primarily Small Business
Investment Companies [SBIC's] and Specialized Small Business Investment
Companies [SSBIC's]), by working significantly outside of the public sector in the
for-profit or nonprofit sector, is capitalized substantially by private sources,
explicitly incorporates social measures as indicators of success, and generally
makes smaller investments than SBIC's and SSBIC's. Finally, Community
Development Venture Capital is distinct among economic development initiatives
targeted at business development because it focuses on equity and growth
oriented or "larger" small businesses rather than micro-enterprise development or
self-employment.
Community Development Venture Capital attempts to link private sector models
of capital generation with socially motivated outcomes, namely job creation for
low-income workers, while establishing an alternative model to investing in
business.
This industry's origin dates back over thirty years but has grown rapidly within the
last ten years'. Recently, the industry has begun to institutionalize itself,
indicated both by the creation of a national trade association (The Community
Development Venture Capital Alliance CDVCA) and increased engagement with
other institutions including the federal government and the banking industry. The
goals of these Funds, to pursue the double bottom line, is predicated on the
1 Rubin, Julia Sass 2001: "Community Development Venture Capital: A Bottom Line Approach to
Poverty Alleviation" April 2001.
feasibility of obtaining 'venture like' financial returns on investment while
substantially forwarding the social objectives of the Fund. These two purposes
are often not inherently aligned, and currently much of the struggle in the industry
is to create a model that effectively and efficiently addresses these two goals.
Are these Funds, which attract socially motivated capital, utilizing it most
effectively to address various community and economic development goals? Is
the Venture Capital financing model the most efficient way to target funds
towards businesses that can improve the economic development of targeted low-
income populations or regions? Given the relative youth of the industry, the
answers to these questions are still far from being understood.
This thesis investigates the burgeoning urban CDVC industry through case
studies of three organizations, Silicon Valley Community Ventures (SVCV),
Boston Community Venture Fund (BCVF) and Murex Investments (MI). These
brief studies focus on two issues: the relationship between Fund investors and
Fund investments, and the social impact measures of the Fund's investments.
The analysis centers primarily on the changes between the CDVC's first and
second Funds to understand the changes occurring in the industry and explore
the potential ramifications of these industry shifts. As the CDVC industry grows
there are indicators that the type of Fund investor is transitioning from primarily
socially motivated foundations to financial institution investors who are concerned
equally with the financial and social returns from their investment. This trend is
highlighted as banks enter into CDVC Fund investment primarily as satisfaction
of their Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)2 compliance. The CRA investments
made from Banks represent a significant funding stream for economic
development therefore its direction into CDVC Funds should be examined.
2 The Community Reinvestment Act is legislation that requires most commercial banks to provide
products and services for the inhabitants of their entire service area. This legislation requires that
banks create and implement products and strategies to ensure access to credit to its entire
constituency. This law was passed primarily because of discriminatory lending practices of many
banks. There are three tests banks must pass: service, lending and investment under CRA.
This thesis argues two main points. First, investors in CDVC Funds have
influence over the type of investments CDVC Funds make, but these influences
have not been examined as they relate to the overall social impact that changes
in investment patterns may have on the CDVC industry. Potentially, the
changing nature of CDVC investors has a considerable effect on the nature and
impact of social returns on investments. Second, the overall measurement of the
social impact of CDVC's has not been developed or implemented in a rigorous or
systematic fashion. This lack of social impact measurement is detrimental to the
industry. To ensure that CDVC's live up to the philosophy of the double bottom
line, the attention to measuring the social returns on investment must be
increased and more comprehensive.
Thesis Organization
Chapter one provides a background on the Community Development Venture
Capital industry. First, this chapter will discuss entrepreneurship within the
broader context of economic development and highlight why entrepreneurship
and business development are a vital and an increasingly utilized strategy for
community economic development. It will discuss the necessity of equity
capitalization for small business development and the current lack of this type of
capital in inner city urban markets. Chapter one will then turn to a brief
discussion of the capital market opportunities and failures as they relate to
traditional and Community Development Venture Capital. The recent emergence
of the CDVC industry significantly limits the amount of research on this topic; as
such this chapter will focus on placing CDVC's within the larger context of
entrepreneurship as a vehicle for economic development and within the
framework of the traditional Venture Capital industry.
Chapter two will focus on three case studies, Boston Community Venture Fund
(BCVF), Silicon Valley Community Ventures (SVCV) and Murex Investments
(MI). Boston Community Ventures is located in Roxbury Massachusetts and
grew out of a successful nonprofit Community Loan Fund established in 1985.
Boston Community Ventures has been highlighted as one of the most successful
young CDVC Funds. BCVF has focused its investment primarily within low-
income communities of Massachusetts; however, it has begun expansion
throughout the Northeast. Boston Community Venture Fund has completely
invested its Fund I and is over halfway through raising its second Fund, which
has begun to make investments. Silicon Valley Community Ventures began in
1998 and is located in San Francisco. The focus of SVCV is the low-income
areas of the Northern California Bay area, including San Francisco, Oakland,
East Palo Alto and San Jose. SVCV also has begun raising a second fund.
Finally, Murex Investments is located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and invests
in the greater Philadelphia region, which includes portions of southern New
Jersey and Delaware. Murex Investments was designated in 2001 as a New
Markets Venture Capital Fund. This program, which is detailed further in this
thesis, grants it access to up to $5.5M federal matching capital for its venture
fund as well as a grant for $1.65M for technical assistance as it raises its second
fund. Murex Investments raised its first Fund and has invested approximately one
half.
These three Funds are focused on urban communities, and indicate job creation
as their primary social impact measure. However, each approaches investing in
distinct ways, has different sources of funding and record and monitor their social
impact using distinct methods. These distinctions are important for several
reasons. First, the approach to investing, or philosophy of each Fund, directly
influences the types of investments it makes and the kinds of social impact
measures it utilizes to screen investment. Second, sources of funding may play
an important role in understanding the types of risk taken and businesses in
which investments are made. Most importantly, these distinctions are included in
a host of variables that will affect a Fund's ability to achieve sustainable social
returns on investment. The chapter will end with a comparison of the three
Funds around the issues of Fund size, Fund investors and investment objectives.
Chapter three will explain and review results of a survey administered by this
author to investors in Community Development Venture Capital funds. The
survey focuses on the key investment objectives of these funders. The survey
was administered as a web based survey3 and was 'distributed' to respondents
by requesting their completion of the survey through email contact. CDVC
funders approached included investors listed by CDVC Funds via their websites
and/or annual reports and through contact information gathered at the March
2002 Annual Community Development Venture Capital Alliance (CDVCA)
conference. This chapter will also address trends in the CDVC industry. This
includes the move of many mature and relatively successful CDVC Funds
towards larger capitalization and larger initial investments. For example, The
Reinvestment Fund, closed its first fund in May 1998 at $1OM, and expects
closing its second fund, Urban Growth Partners, at $50M. It is proposed in this
thesis that this industry growth will likely affect the types of businesses the
industry is able and willing to invest in and potentially the social impacts achieved
by these funds. Second, an introduction of new funders into the investor pool
may have further ramifications on the industry, for example Silicon Valley
Community Ventures has secured a $1OM commitment from CalPERS, the
largest US pension fund for its second fund SVCV LLC II. Pension funds have
recently played a big role in transforming the fundraising of traditional Venture
Capital and although it is too soon to know if other pension funds will follow
CalPERS lead, there could be significant impact on the CDVC industry by the
introduction of these large pools of capital. The increased participation of banks
as CDVC funders has also been well documented by the Community
Development Venture Capital Alliance, and will be reviewed. The paper will then
report on two new policies that may significantly affect the Community
Development Venture Capital Industry. These policies, New Markets Venture
Capital and New Markets Tax Credits are recent legislation that attempts to
3 See Appendix 1 for survey form. Two surveys were administered via phone after web based
attempts elicited no response from investors.
increase the level of capital earmarked for small business equity investing, as
well as provide a stimulus for new investors in CDVC funds. These two
programs can potentially play a role in shaping where and how CDVC's conduct
their business. This chapter will conclude with an analysis of the varied trends,
and argue for increased attention to the alignment of investors and Fund
investments.
Chapter four will discuss further the types of social impact indicators utilized by
the industry and specifically by the three Funds detailed in this thesis. I will first
analyze Funds social returns based on job creation/retention. This section will
also introduce a new perspective to use when reviewing the social impact of
CDVC funds, by investigating the Portfolio Company locations as they relate to
urban/high poverty areas. I contend that this is an important tool to use to
evaluate the social impact of CDVC Funds and can be relatively simple to
conduct. This chapter will further make an argument for the need to increase the
level of rigor and type of social impact indicators utilized and administered.
Further it will be argued that the sources of funds used to capitalize CDVC Funds
and the stated purpose of the industry necessitate increased attention paid to the
social return component of the double bottom line investment strategy. This
chapter will conclude by providing recommendations to capture opportunities to
improve the social impact measurements as well as the industry benefits to
increasing these measurements.
Chapter five will provide a conclusion to this thesis. I will synthesize the two key
issues the thesis has addressed; influence of investors on CDVC investments
and the impact of and overall lack of substantial measurement of the social
returns provided by these types of investment. I will reiterate recommendations
put forth in chapters three and four. This thesis concludes with a call to the
industry to live up to its double bottom line credo and rigorously address the
social impact that CDVCs are posed to make in urban economic development.
Why Study Community Development Venture Capital?
The study of Community Development Venture Capital is important to
understand urban economic development for several reasons. First, economic
development strategies have and continue to focus on entrepreneurship and
business development as a vehicle for wealth accumulation and economic
revitalization of low-income areas. The financial development of any business
requires both equity and debt components. Community Development Venture
Capital represents a unique method of introducing equity capital to businesses
that may otherwise not receive or have access to equity. These companies also
often locate in and/or employ residents of low-income urban areas. Second,
Community Development Venture Capital proposes to incorporate both a
financial and social bottom line. Because of this dual bottom line approach to
investing, CDVC Funds have access to a variety of funding sources, such as
foundations, philanthropic individuals, banks satisfying CRA credits, and other
socially motivated investors. These investors often represent pools of capital that
would otherwise be directed to some other community/economic development
benefit. The degree to which, how, and the results of measuring social returns
on investment are key to understanding the social impact of these funds and
should inform how community/economic development dollars are allocated to this
industry. Finally, as extensively documented, urban high poverty areas have
been losing businesses to suburban areas for a long period in the US, activities
that encourage development of inner city business that employ low income/low
skilled inner city residents may be able to play a key role as a catalyst in
encouraging the return of 'good paying jobs' into the inner city. Ultimately, "it is
the engine of investment capital, coupled with entrepreneurship, that drives job
and wealth creation". 4 It is the expansion of these resources into the under-
served low-income inner city that will contribute to the economic and physical
revitalization of these communities.
4 p7 California State Treasurer 2000: "The Double Bottom Line: Investing in California's Emerging
Markets" Policy Paper.
Chapter One
Economic Development & Entrepreneurship
Economic development has been popularly defined "as the process of creating
wealth through the mobilization of human, financial, capital, physical and natural
resources to generate marketable goods and services".5 This relatively broad
definition has been challenged by some, who believe that "part of the reason for
the vigorous debate surrounding inner-city economic development is due to this
definition", and believe that there is a "tendency to widen the definition of
economic development to include virtually everything.. .[and] individuals and
organizations have tended to focus on one or a few specific elements of
economic development ... and assert their primacy"6 . Richard Bingham in
Financinq Economic Development simplifies this discussion to say, "essentially it
[economic development] is the creation of jobs and wealth"J. Finally, Kieschnick
and Parzen narrow this definition of economic development by tying it to the type
of jobs and wealth created as, "an increase in economic activity that results in a
wider distribution of the quantities being measured"8 . This outlook specifies that
not only are jobs and wealth created, but they are created in such a way as to
increase the distribution of these capital gains. This is the definition of economic
development the CDVC industry occupies; traditional Venture Capital may create
jobs and wealth but Community Development Venture Capital is concerned with
the quality of those jobs and the expansion of that wealth to new
people/businesses.
Economic development, as a distinct initiative of American policy, is a late
twentieth century phenomenon, with many tracing its modern history to the late
1960's/early 1970's. Ed Blakely, a prominent academic and practitioner of urban
economic development, refers to the 'three waves' of economic development
5 American Economic Development Council definition
6 p310 Porter, Michael in The Inner City eds.Boston and Ross
7 p7Bingham, Richard Financing Economic Development
8 p5 Parzen and Kieschnick Credit Where Its Due
policy. The first wave was industrial attraction, or 'smokestack chasing', the
practice of many states to lure companies by using tools like subsidized loans or
direct payments to companies for relocation expenses, tax deductions and
industrial recruitment programs. The intention is to attract large businesses into
a local market that will create a demand for large amounts of labor and increased
property tax revenues over the long run. Natural conflicts that arise are the small
number of very large businesses and the competition from other localities for this
finite resource. The second wave began in the 1980's and "shifted the focus
from attracting out of state firms to retaining and expanding existing firms"9.
Tools used in this wave included technical assistance, increasing investment
capital, business incubators and creating new businesses. The third wave, which
it is hypothesized US economic development is currently experiencing, is
focused on local economic development that creates strategic partnerships
between private and public networks that leverage capital (both human and
financial) to increase local business competitiveness. Blakely states that the
coming of this 'third wave' does not necessarily circumvent the first two waves
but rather provides a new way to address the economic development strategies
of these two waves. Henry Cisneros, in his essay "Urban Entrepreneurship and
National Economic Growth" confirms this shift from the old paradigm of economic
development. He writes, " communities using this [new] approach examine their
regions heritage, its comparative advantages, in light of its national and
international market trends and develop a strategic vision to guide realistic
development. They emphasize retaining existing entrepreneurs and helping
them expand locally rather that relying on new firms from other regions to come
in and spur growth."10
The focus on entrepreneurship and business development within the context of
local and regional development is well positioned within the field of economic
development. In the context of urban economic revitalization much of the focus
9 p230 Blakely, Edward Planning Local Economic Development
10 p4 Cisneros, Henry 1995: "Urban Entrepreneurship and National Economic Growth"
on entrepreneurship and business creation has been on entrepreneurial training,
small business lending and recently microenterprise development. Each of these
three aspects of business development is vital to overall urban economic
development, and should be viewed as part of a continuum of policies and
practices focused on increasing inner city entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurial
training is a key component of making individuals 'ready' to begin or expand
small business and is supported by various non-profits and Community
Development Corporations concerned generally with capacity building among
urban residents and business owners. Small business lending programs provide
access to capital for individuals and companies that may not fit the underwriting
profile of traditional commercial banks. Participants in small business lending
range from Community Development Corporations to Bank owned CDCs, and
various Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs). The Small
Business Administration and the regulations of the Community Reinvestment Act
further federally support small business financing. Finally, microenterprise
programs, which gained currency in the 1990's and grew out peer lending
programs in developing countries, generally fit both training and access to capital
together to promote and support very small business development. These
programs support home based business to small neighborhood scale industries,
(generally with no more than five employees) and are centered extensively on
the benefits of self-employment. These entrepreneurship programs, however, do
not address two primary issues that are key to Community Development Venture
Capital. First, the infusion of equity into small and growing businesses and
second, growth-oriented businesses that currently or potentially have the ability
to create employment opportunities for a significant amount of local residents.
In Planninq Local Development, Ed Blakely identifies twelve basic tools central to
business development in the inner city:
1. one stop centers
2. start-up and venture financing
3. small business development centers/small business lending
4. support for women owned enterprises
5. group marketing systems
6. promotion and tourism programs
7. research and development investment
8. incubation services/centers
9. microenterprise programs
10. technology and business clusters
11.empowerment zones
12. entrepreneur training
and a strategy which includes at least one of four basic initiatives;
1. encouraging business creation
2. attraction of new businesses
3. retention and growth of businesses
4. increase in innovation and entrepreneurship of local residents.
(bold mine; represents tools and strategies utilized by CDVC's)
Community Development Venture Capital may be seen within the context of both
the 'new paradigm' of economic development as described above and as a
mechanism that fits into several of the basic strategies laid out above for local
inner city economic development. As will be further developed in the overview of
Community Development Venture Capital to follow, the industry attempts to
provide a new synthesis (third wave) of second wave economic development
objectives. By increasing capital access to new and/or growing businesses
(within specific industries/sectors) CDVC Funds seek to both spur and retain new
businesses providing necessary equity and needed management assistance.
These businesses are then better able to provide high wage/low skilled jobs for
inner city residents. The Funds focus on business creation and retention, not
attraction away from other regions. Additionally, CDVC Funds create new
public/private networks to fulfill their missions. CDVC Funds pull from a diversity
of human and financial capital. Management often comes from the community
development field, as well as traditional Venture Capital or mainstream financial
markets. The industry's funding sources include: government (local, state and
federal), foundations, financial institutions, individuals as well as a recent
introduction of pension and insurance company funds. They are able to leverage
their investment in companies with investments by other private and public
institutions, creating a new network of stakeholders in business development, as
described in the third wave of economic development put forth by Blakely.
Community Development Venture Capital's unique position within the realm of
entrepreneurial-based economic development is two fold. To the degree that it is
able to address the continued focus of business development in suburban areas
or overseas, it is potentially a player in the reversal of this trend away from inner
city business development. The industry's influence in the creation or retention
of small to medium sized businesses that provide living wages in inner city
locations that have, for the past thirty years, lost industry to outside locations can
be seen as a vital contribution of this field. Second, and perhaps most
importantly, Community Development Venture Capital is a crucial entrant in to
entrepreneurial-based economic development because,
"risk capital funding (equity) is perhaps the weakest link in a strategy of
entrepreneurial based economic development. Entrepreneur's access to
risk capital is the single most critical barrier to business start-up and
growth. Once personal and family funds are exhausted, entrepreneurs
face the challenge of raising external capital. This task is daunting
because most firms do not meet the stringent requirements of venture
capital professionals""
This apparent dearth of, or difficulty in, accessing equity for entrepreneurs is well
documented. In mainstream financial markets this equity gap is filled through
several mechanisms. First, business owners will generally turn to their personal
savings and assets in search of equity. Second, entrepreneurs will reach out to a
wider social network of family and friends to informally 'invest' in their business.
The next stage of equity investment will likely be the attraction of 'angel' investors
into businesses. Angels are wealthy individuals who provide equity in exchange
for an ownership stake in a company and may provide advice or technical
11 p266 Bingham, Richard Financing Economic Development
12 see Rubin, Julia S; Porter, Michael; Dymski, George
expertise (depending on the 'angel'). The final stage in equity investment is the
institutional investor, or venture capitalist. Venture capitalists again, provide
equity in exchange for an ownership stake in a company and will provide
technical and management assistance to the companies in which it invests. This
final stage in equity is arranged so that relatively large investments ($5-20M) are
made so that potential gains offset significant risks and transaction costs.
Equity investment, like all financial transactions, occurs within a market. A
market is defined simply as the space within which funds flow between investors,
borrowers and intermediaries. The assumption in capital market theory is that
markets act competitively (perfectly) such that all of the players make rational
decisions to achieve the highest return on investments given high degrees of
safety, liquidity and ease of transactions. Whenever rational decisions that would
efficiently allocate resources to 'good investments' don't happen, a failure has
occurred. Competitive markets only work when several key things are in place.
First, all information is known, second there are no barriers to entry into the
market and third, there are no transaction costs. Practically this is rarely, if ever
the case. Rational equity capital needs that are not satisfied by the traditional
equity financing market can be considered a market failure. Community
Development Venture Capital can be understood as a supply side response to a
capital market failure of Venture Capital. CDVC's make investments in
companies that the traditional Venture Capital industry does not because of a
lack of information, or a perceived risk associated with a particular type of
business or community; appreciably higher transaction costs than traditional
Venture Capital given small investment size, lower expected financial rates of
return and the absence of social returns factored into traditional Venture Capital
economics.
Community Development Venture Capital therefore uses the financial model of
Venture Capital in its infusion of equity into new and growing businesses in an
attempt to combat the market failures. A brief discussion of the structure and
current state of Venture Capital is important to understand prior to an evaluation
of the Community Development Venture Capital field. This paper will now turn to
a review of traditional Venture Capital.
Venture Capital Financing
Fundamentally, Venture Capital does one thing, it provides equity capital for
businesses to start, improve or grow their enterprise. It does this because most
often companies and their owners lack the necessary capital to conduct
research, purchase hard assets, secure debt or otherwise engage in activity that
makes their firm more profitable. Venture Capital exists to fill that gap. This
capital gap can occur for several reasons. "The four critical factors [are]:
uncertainty, asymmetric information, the nature of the firm's assets and
conditions in the relevant financial and product markets". 3 Uncertainty is most
poignant in new companies that do not have a proven track record. Without this
track record companies are often unable to find financing from the traditional
financial market such as banks and trade credit. Asymmetric information
generally refers to the entrepreneur's knowledge about their business, which may
influence business decisions. These decisions often seem ill advised to an
outside observer because they are not privy to the same 'inside information' as
the entrepreneur. A key third obstacle is assets. New businesses often have
soft assets (like a patent or product innovation) they may not, however, have
significant hard assets (like real estate); this limits their ability to obtain debt
based on some form of equity/collateral requirement. Finally, various market
conditions influence the general difficulty of securing financing for an unproven or
expanding business.
Practically, venture capitalists do more than simply invest money in a company.
Venture Capital has become a relatively institutionalized process with distinct
mechanisms established to help ensure that the investment made will result in a
profitable return. Venture capitalists often perform high levels of due diligence on
13 p127 Lerner and Gompers The Money of Invention.
a company, and look for strong management teams and new ideas that are likely
to have a competitive advantage in the current marketplace. Once an investment
is made, Venture Capitalists then often take an active role in their Portfolio
Company, usually taking a seat on the company's board and will influence
business and management decisions. Last, venture capitalist investors sell their
investment through a variety of ways including management buyout or initial
public offering's in the hopes of receiving a significant return on their investment
to compensate for what they believe is a hefty risk in investing in that company.
Venture Capital has been criticized for some of the Funds' aggressive Portfolio
Company management tactics that may include; replacement of company
management, sale of portions of businesses and other actions that may override
the entrepreneurs choice for the business' direction. All this is done in an effort
to secure the highest possible financial return on the VC's investment.
It is important to understand how Venture Capital, and therefore most CDVC
Funds are organized to understand the opportunities and limitations of this
financial tool. Venture Capital investments are organized through the raising of a
'fund'. A Fund is raised by General Partners (GP) who then attract Limited
Partners (LP) to act as the Fund's investors. The General Partners take all of the
responsibility for managing the Fund and for their work receive a management
fee (usually 2%-3% of the Fund's capital) and 20% carried interest (or the returns
from investment). The Limited Partners receive a return of their initial investment
plus 80% of any additional returns on investment. A Fund will most often have a
limited 'lifetime' of 10 years, within which Portfolio Companies are invested in
and exited with (hopefully) positive returns on the investment. Traditional venture
capitalists will generally look for expected rates of return between 25-40% (called
a hurdle rate) during due diligence before making any investment. The industry
long-term average rate of return is between 17-25%.
Traditional Venture Capital has grown in the past two and half decades from a
Table 1 Piricwahuscoer/etureEconomcVA
Venture Capital Fund Investment in United
States Portfolio Conpanies
Year Companies Investment($M)
1991 369.3
1992 1053 3826.0
1993 943 4563.0
1994 953 3794.1
1995 1144 5070.8
1996 1665 9639.5
1997 2270 14350.4
1998 2693 19175.8
1999 3835 52416.8
2000 5324 99636.5
2001 3058 36537.3
$1B industry in 1976 to peak at a $100 B industry in 2000. Table 1 illustrates this
growth over the past ten years; the industry's capitalization approximately grew
1000% between 1991 and 2001.
For the year 2000 the funders of traditional Venture Capital were led by
public/private pension funds, with banks/insurance companies and endowments
rounding out the top investors (see Table 2). The expansion of pension fund
investing indicates that overall industry growth is likely to continue. For example,
CalPERS, the largest state pension fund in the US recently raised its venture
fund investing from 5% to 16% of its investment portfolio. Pension funds control
the largest concentrated amounts of 'investible' dollars in the US, and CalPERS
is the largest pension fund in the US.
Funding Sources for Venture Capital Yr 2000
corporations
4%
individuals
12%
endowments
21%
private/public
pension funds
40%
Insurance/
Banks
23%
Table 2 Source Gompers and Lerner
In 2001 $36.5B was invested14 , down from historic investment activity in 2000 of
$100B and initial investment in portfolio companies was on average $7M (again
down from a high of $10M in 1999 and 2000). Additionally, the average size of a
Venture Capital fund was $141.8M in 2001 (down from $173.1M in 2000). In
2000 the investments by traditional Venture Capitalists by industry are as follows:
1 www.nvca.orq 2002: "Venture Capital Investment Increases in Q4 for First Time Since Mid-
2000 2001 Finishes as 3 rd Strongest Year for Venture Capital" March 2002 .
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internet specific 47851 46%
communications 17628 17%
computer software 14374 14%
semiconductors/electronic 6099 6%
medical health 3614 4%
other products 5279 5%
biotech 2764 3%
computer hardware 2279 2%
consumer related 1666 2%
industrial/energy 1424 1%
Total 102978 100%
source: www.nvca.org
Table 3
It is expected that the Venture Capital industry will go through several
fluctuations in the coming years. For example, in 2001 investment in
biotechnology increased as an overall percentage of all Venture Capital
investment from 3% in 2000 to 8.2%. Other industry focus changes may also
occur. Additionally, overall Venture Capital investing has decreased since 2000
highs due to several key factors: 1) Over-saturation of Internet related
investments and subsequent losses 2) Overall US economic downturn; 3) Events
related to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
Some Venture Capital experts go beyond the financial attributes of Venture
Capital and insist that venture capitalists not only invest in risky companies that
would otherwise not receive financial backing, but spur innovation and
significantly contribute to regional economic development and job creation. A
report sponsored by the National Venture Capital Association and conducted by
WEFA (Wharton Econometric Forecasting Association) tracked all venture-
backed companies from 1970 through 2000 to track their aggregate job creation
and revenues for the year 2000. According to this study, these companies
created 4.3 million jobs and had revenues of $736B in 2000. This type of
tracking shows that traditional Venture Capital may substantially contribute to job
creation and the overall wealth of regional economies. Some believe this helps
to prove that, "Venture Capital can play a role in spurring the growth of new jobs,
the employment skill base, and entrepreneurial activity."05 They do not, however,
discuss the nature of the job creation nor the types of entrepreneurs supported
by the Venture Capital industry. The degree to which Venture Capital satisfies
the definition of economic development as a mechanism to, "increase economic
activity that results in a wider distribution"16 of wealth is not examined. Without
this further distinction Venture Capital may be seen as a tool for economic growth
rather than for economic development. Last, any discussion regarding the
economic development merits of Venture Capital should be tempered by
acknowledging that, " the objective of a Venture Capital firm is to generate long
term capital appreciation through debt and equity investment... [E]ven though
Venture Capitalists assist in the creation of jobs and the economic development
of business within a region, the important driving factor is the realization of
substantial capital gains."17
Community Development Venture Capital
Community Development Venture Capital (CDVC), like traditional Venture
Capital, provides equity or patient capital to businesses in various stages of
creation and growth. As such, the capital invested into CDVC Portfolio
Companies is risky and the goal is, like traditional Venture Capital, to secure
financial returns on investments that incorporate the high-risk levels (e.g. high
risk = high return). CDVC's however incorporate an additional measure by which
they evaluate potential investments, social returns. There is a diversity of social
screens utilized in the CDVC industry. Most often the primary social screen is
the somewhat ambiguous objective of poverty alleviation. Functionally, this has
meant a focus on high wage/low skill job creation providing living wages for low
skilled/low income workers. Additional CDVC Fund social goals include: growth
of entrepreneurial capacity, promotion of minority and women owned businesses,
expansion of good employment practices, production of goods beneficial to high
poverty communities, promotion of environmentally sustainable businesses and
1 p8 Gompers and Lerner The Money of Invention.
1 p6 Parzen, and Kieschnick Credit Where it's Due.
commercial/economic development and stability of high poverty neighborhood or
regions.1 As a final point, most Funds operate within a distinct geography;
about half of all CDVC Funds are located within rural areas and focus on
improving business opportunities for rural communities. The other half of Funds
are regionally and/or urban focused and concentrate on low-income urban
neighborhoods as their primary investment target area.
In the industry this dual focus (social and financial) is called the double bottom
line. Taking into account the dual objectives of these Funds, and the subsequent
limitations that places on investments19, expectations on the rates of financial
return are often below the goals of traditional venture capitalists; expected rates
are around 10-15% as opposed to traditional VC hurdle rates of 25-40% or
higher.
CDVC Funds should also be seen within a greater community of alternative
financial institutions that can in part be described as Community Development
Financial Institutions (CDFI). Currently, CDFI's represent community loan funds,
credit unions and increasingly Community Development Venture Capital funds.
Approximately 550 organizations nationwide were identified as CDFIs and in
2001 they had combined resources of $6B. 0 These organizations provide
'alternative financing' to a host of different projects from housing to childcare to
social service organizations to businesses.
The first, (and still operating) CDVC organization is the Kentucky Highlands
Investment Corporation, which in 1978 formed a venture fund to provide equity
17 p108 Davis, Barry Entrepreneurship, Intraprenuership and Venture Capital.
18 Schmitt, Brian T. 2001: "Measuring Social returns in Community Development Venture Capital"
unpublished report sponsored by the Rockefeller and Hewlett Foundations, May 1, 2001.
19As an example because CDVC funds are interested in the creation of 'good jobs', or living
wage jobs for relatively low skilled workers, many focus on investment in manufacturing
companies, as opposed to high tech companies which may also create jobs but likely create high
skilled jobs inaccessible to many low income/low skilled workers.
2 Nancy Andrews, 2001 :"Equity with a Twist: The Changing Capital Needs of the Community
Development Field" April 2001.
investments for companies in or willing to relocate to Kentucky. Kentucky
Highlands is a Community Development Corporation, and its venture fund was
and continues to be primarily capitalized by the US government.21 Northeast
Ventures of Minnesota, another Fund with a long history, was first capitalized in
1987 without the sponsorship of government but rather primarily by
foundations. This model of capitalizing funds without the heavy reliance on
government funding has become a trademark of the CDVC industry, focused
instead on raising capital from financial institutions and foundations.
Table 4 Source CDVCA research presented March 2002
Funding for CDVC's as of 2001
Other Development Venture
7%
Government GovermentCapital is a small but13%
growing industry.
According to the
Corporations 2
13% Banks CDVCA there are
55%
currently sixty domestic
Fondtin Funds and tenFoundations
12% international Funds.
Domestic Funds are capitalized at a total amount of $400M. Much of this
capitalization has come recently, with a growth of $10M under management
between 2000 and 2001. The Funds are predominately capitalized by banks
followed by foundations, corporations, government and other (which includes
insurance companies, individuals and recently pension funds). Of the sixty
domestic Funds, the most common organizational structure is a non-profit,
followed by limited partnersh ips.24 CDVC Funds follow traditional Venture Capital
structures. CDVC Funds have thus far invested in about 250 Portfolio
21 Rubin, Julia Sass 2001: "Community Development Venture Capital: A Double Bottom Line
Approach to Poverty Alleviation" April 2001.
22 Ibid
23 CDVCA presentation CDVC: An Update on the Industry, CVDVCA Conference March 2002
dmsCDVCA presentation March 2002 CDVC structures: 52% nonprofit, 17% limited partnership,
13% limited liability company, 13% c-corporation and 5%'quasi-governmental as of end 2001-
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Companies and this investment is most heavily concentrated in manufacturing,
totaling approximately 49% of all investments. This contrasts starkly with
traditional Venture Capital that has concentrated 80% of investments in high
technology companies. The sixty Funds however, include Funds that primarily
provide debt as well as those concentrated on equity investment. Of the sixty
Funds there are currently twenty-five Funds that act primarily as an equity
vehicle. These twenty-five Funds are most often organized as Limited Liability
Companies, with the Limited Partner-General Partner management structure and
had invested in 162 businesses by the end of 2000. Average total financing per
Portfolio Company was $330,000, significantly less then the initial investment
levels of traditional Venture Capital at $7-10M. Finally, these twenty-five equity
focused Funds had exited approximately fifty-four deals: sixteen were written off,
twenty were exited through external sales, six through near-equity loan
payments, six through management buyback, five through IPO and one through
an employee stock option (ESOP) by 2000. As calculated by CDVCA the net
capital gains (losses) for year end 2000 for these twenty-five Funds was $6.1 M
gains and $2.1M in losses ($4M gains) for for-profit Funds and $7.9M ($8.2M
positive earnings and $3M negative earnings) for non profit Funds. Social
returns, measured in terms of job creation/retention, as of the end of 2000
include the maintenance of 11,788 jobs and creation of 4,590 jobs.
A 2000 report by Boston Community Capital25 notes several current obstacles for
the CDVC Industry. The three primary industry challenges noted are: 1) Growing
to Scale; 2) Operating Challenges; and 3) Pipeline and Dealflow. The scale of
the industry affects the ability of Funds to successfully invest and obtain its
double bottom line in several different ways. Funds are on average relatively
small. CDVC Funds are likely to be capitalized between $5-20M. This reduces
both the amount and size of deals that they can enter. The industry's youth
leaves it without a substantial track record; many CDVCs have yet to exit their
25 Boston Community Capital 2000: "No Exit" Phase I Report to the Ford Foundation October 5,2000
first Fund. Finally, key informational and capital barriers exist, as people don't
know what CDVC is and those who do have proportionately less money to invest
in CDVC Funds. Operationally, CDVC's face several additional challenges: first,
there is difficulty attracting top venture fund managers given the reduced pay
scale of CDVC's. This effectively lowers the overall expertise CDVC Fund
management. Additionally, the fixed overhead costs of due diligence on smaller
deals, which fit both investment capabilities and social criteria, result in lower
return margins given standard management fees for venture funds. Finally,
pipeline and deal flow create unique challenges for CDVC Funds. CDVC Funds
cite relationships with SBA lenders or other community economic development
organizations as often their first entry point when locating potential deals. This
has proved limiting because often these organizations focus on microenterprises
or local independent shops which are often not suitable for equity investment.
CDVC's have also reached out to Banks, other CDVC's and traditional venture
capitalist to find deals. These again, suffer from the lack of a 'good fit'; often
Venture Capital and bank referrals lack the social component necessarily to
make a CDVC investment likely.
CDVC Funds have, however, continued to grow as noted above, and many
Funds are currently raising second funds that will, at close, be significantly larger
than their first. Additionally, the overall change in the Venture Capital industry
(the bottoming out of internet companies) has made the CDVC return projects of
10-15% more reasonable in the current investment market. Finally, programs like
New Markets Venture Capital and New Markets Tax Credits have introduced the
federal government as a new financial partner in CDVC funds. These trends will
be discussed in further detail in chapter three.
Alternative Venture Capital
It should be noted there is a long history of creating alternatives to the traditional
Venture Capital industry to attempt to address some of the market failures
addressed previously. The Small Business Administration (SBA) created two
programs, SBIC and SSBIC (formerly MESBIC) as mechanisms for attracting
investment into small businesses. The SBIC program, established in 1958,
provides SBA matching debentures for funds raised by venture firms which
specifically focus on small businesses; Venture Capital firms can be designated
as SBIC's and receive various benefits (but also restrictions) when investing in
these businesses. Some SBIC's mirror traditional Venture Capital firms, though
many are capitalized at smaller amounts and have smaller individual
investments. SSBIC's were introduced in 1969 and are Venture Capital firms
which focus on investing (both equity and long term debt) in minority owned
businesses. This program was intended to work similarly to the SBIC program
with the distinction of investing in enterprises owned by minorities. This program
has, however, been phased out and only those venture firms existing prior to
1995 are licensed and can still operate under this program. The US Congress
terminated the licensing of new SSBIC companies because, among other
reasons, they have on the whole been deemed as unsuccessful in providing
equity capital to growth oriented minority businesses26. It is important to note
that, in addition to SBA funding, these two programs often receive funding from
financial institutions that can, in many cases, receive CRA credits for their
investments.
Many states have also established state sponsored Venture Capital funds, these
programs generally began in the 1970's and have continued since in various
incarnations. Many times these Funds focus on encouraging particular types of
industry within a state. These funds are important to mention within the context of
CDVC because they often have their own 'social screens' that may include a
particular type of business or business owner (minority/women) or particularly
geography currently underserved by Venture Capital. Most recently a 'new' type
of state sponsored Venture Capital has begun to grow, Certified Capital
Companies (CAPCOs), which are funded by insurance companies. "As an
2 Please see Timothy Bates for a detailed discussion on SSBIC's and their creation, operation
and effectiveness on encouraging minority entrepreneurship.
incentive to invest in CAPCOs, insurance companies receive a $1 credit on
premium taxes for each $1 invested (tax credits are spread over ten years)".2 7
As of November 2001 five states had CAPCOs operating in their state and eight
additional states were in the process of legislating these entities. Primarily,
CAPCOs are intended to promote venture activity within the sponsoring state or
particular sections of that state with a potential additional requirement to focus on
early stage business. However, an in depth discussion of these alternative
venture capital funds is not within the scope of this paper.
Below is a chart which briefly compares traditional Venture Capital, Community
Development Venture Capital SSBIC'S and SSBIC'S along the target categories:
company size, company stage, industries, social return, financial return,
investment horizon, investment form, restrictions on investment, geographic
limitations and average investment size.
27Barkley, David L., Markley, Deborah M., and Rubin, Julia Sass 2001: "Certified Capital
Companies (CAPCOs): Strengths and Shortcomings of the Latest Wave in State-Assisted
Venture Capital Programs," Economic Development Quarterly
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Comparison on Venture Capital Fund Models in the United States
Medium-Largelvery small -small small -medium very small-small
all stages early-growth stage early -growth all stages
(focus on later stage
st___ __g
high tech none (some focus on high tech all industries
bio-tech manufacturing) bio-tech
services services_____serrvic_
none job creation asset creation small business small business
environmental protection development development for
entreprenuerial development minority and
goods and services for soci- economically
economically disadvantaged disavantaged
and minority groups inner entreprenuers
citylrural revitalization________
equity debt & equity debt & equity debt
short-medium short-long term short-mid term short-mid term
term
none none (provide social return) SBA small SBA,
business minority/women
owned
$5-$10M $300,000-$1M $1-$5M unknown
regional low income communities regional regional
national regional national national
international state
Table 5 modified from BCC Phase I Report to the Ford Foundation October 5, 2000
The differences between these four models of Venture Capital illustrated above
consist of three primary variations. First, there are distinctions in the business
sectors that each Fund type is most likely to invest in. Traditional VC is looking
most often to invest in very high growth, likely IPO businesses; this has created a
focus on high tech industries which have in recent history proved to provide the
most substantial returns. SBIC's are also active in this market, most often with
similar sector companies that have a reduced capacity for large-scale equity
investment. SSBIC's have traditionally focused more of their investment in
equity-like products. As opposed to true equity, this debt investment has
required SSBICs to look for businesses with high levels of hard assets to provide
asset based lending products. In fact, one of the primary businesses that
SSBICs have successfully invested in is taxicab medallions, with a high asset
worth. CDVCs have both equity and debt investments, twenty-five of the sixty
CDVC Funds primarily provide equity to their Portfolio Companies. The Portfolio
Companies most likely to create good quality jobs, has translated into a focus on
the manufacturing sector, which is generally a slower growth industry, and less
likely to achieve IPO status. Fund capitalization is the second key difference.
SBICs and SSBICs rely heavily on government financing and to varying degrees
on debt from the SBA. Traditional VCs are invested at higher levels and almost
solely with equity investment. CDVC Funds have a variety of funding sources,
are capitalized at relatively small amounts, but increasingly are being capitalized
by banks that use the investment as a satisfaction of their CRA requirements. As
referred to above, these four VC models provide varying levels of investment.
This third difference is illustrated by the relatively large traditional VC investments
of $5M-$20M, the SBIC investment size of $1 M-$5M, and the CDVC investment
average of closer to $300,000-$500,000. As it has been laid out it seems that
these four models of Venture Capital investment have investment strategies that
do not overlap. They are differentiated by investment size, investment sector or
investment capabilities and philosophy. The degree to which they remain
separate, yet each fulfilling a particular unmet capital need in a profitable
manner, appears likely to satisfy distinct niches in the equity financial market.
However, as will be illustrated through this thesis, changes in the CDVC industry
may change its ability to satisfy its current strategy of; low investment size, and
manufacturing (high job quality) sector focus guided by socially motivated criteria.
Chapter Two
This paper will now turn to three brief case studies used to examine the mission
and the investment philosophy as well as the influence of investors on CDVC
Funds. The CDVC Funds were chosen for the following reasons. The three
Funds, Boston Community Venture Fund, Silicon Valley Community Ventures
and Murex Investments are all urban based and primarily urban investment
focused Funds. All three Funds, as with most CDVC Funds, place job creation
as their primary social impact return. These Funds have also embarked on the
raising of a Fund II, however through different strategies, and are at different
stages of capitalization. Finally, attention was paid to geographic diversity. Key
members of each fund were interviewed 28 during March 2002 to collect the
primary data for these cases studies; additional information was provided by
public and internal Fund documents as well as industry documents.
Murex Investments
Fund Development
Murex Investment (MI) is a Community Development Venture Capital
organization located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and was founded in 1998.
Murex Investments is a wholly owned subsidiary of Resources for Human
Development (RHD), a multi-service workforce development organization that
has focused significantly on increasing and supporting employment opportunities
for the mentally challenged. RHD is a $90M nonprofit founded in 1970 and
currently operates over 130 social service oriented programs. The mission of
Murex Investments is to invest in companies that transform distressed areas by
maximizing social and financial returns for investors, entrepreneurs and
employees. To ensure the satisfaction of this mission, Murex Investments
requires that each business it invests in, "locate in a distressed area and/or
28 See Appendix 3 for interview questions.
employ a majority of low income people; pay a living wage with benefits; and
offer profit-sharing and ownership to all employees."29
The investment strategy of Murex Investments Fund I has been influenced by a
pedagogy that strongly supports worker ownership. The initial interest in
beginning a CDVC Fund was the ideal of replicating the business practices of
Mondragon in Basque, Spain. 30 The Mondragon Cooperative Corporation (MCC)
has been upheld as an example of a successful organization based on the
fundamental principles of worker inclusion and democracy. Today, the company
is comprised of about 150 cooperatives in the Basque region of Spain; the
cooperatives employ roughly 42,000 workers. The main focus of the Association
of the Mondragon Cooperatives is the creation of owner-employee jobs; MCC
also has a unique approach to business development. The new enterprise and
the MCC bank agree to stay together until the business is profitable. If the
business runs into trouble the bank will loan additional capital at roughly half the
initial rate. If the company is still in financial trouble the interest rate will be
dropped to zero, and if more assistance is needed the bank may donate capital
to the business. Eventually, even if the company has to go through drastic
changes like new managers or new product lines, the business becomes
successful and is able to repay the loans. This pedagogy influenced MI to
initially concentrate on solid businesses in need of 'turn around' assistance, the
idea is to add the capital necessary for a company to eventually become
successful, instead of divesting in a company because of its current financial
troubles. The value is placed on the retention of the company, the quality jobs it
creates, and the incorporation of employee ownership in to business plans. MI's
strategy to address these issues is by providing intensive technical assistance for
the necessary improvements to business practices. Murex Investments was able
to follow this investment philosophy, a decidedly risky approach to investing in
'near death' turn around companies, in part because Fund I's capitalization was
29 Murex Investments internal document.
30 Interview Murex Investments Fund Manager March 2002
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made up entirely of grant funding.31 They were able to adhere very closely to the
maintenance of their social impact strategy with each investment. Murex
Investments believes the key component of their investment strategy is to
provide intensive technical assistance to companies.
Investors and Investment
Murex Investments capitalized its first Fund at $5.2M and invested a total of
$2.75M of Fund I in seven companies. MI believes that these investments have
resulted in the creation or retention of 200 'quality jobs'. Fund I was capitalized
100% by grant funding with no requirements for financial return on investment.
Fund I investors were two banks, City and State government. Any returns
received by this first Fund were to be reinvested in the Fund, not distributed.
For their second Fund Murex Investments has been designated as a New Market
Venture Capital organization. This new federal program (to be analyzed in
further detail in chapter three) provides the Fund with $5.5M of debenture, at
6.5% interest, from the (SBA) given they are able to raise an equal amount of
capital from non-federal government sources. Additionally, this designation
comes with a $1.65M grant for technical assistance given Murex Investments can
raise a matching $1.65M in grants for technical assistance. Currently, MI has
raised $4.25M of the required match and has until the end of 2002 to raise the
additional $1.25M required to receive the NMVC matching debenture. Assuming
that Murex Investments receives $5.5M from the NMVC designation their current
capitalization of Fund 11 is represented below:
31 Ibid
For Fund 11 Murex Investments is anticipating a financial return of 10%-12%, and
will invest in approximately thirty companies, an average of $350,000 per
Portfolio Company. Murex Investments has further defined its investment criteria
in Fund II. They propose four broad categories of financing opportunities.
1. Growth Companies: Murex investments expects to invest between $400K-
$600K per deal in 8-10 companies.
2. Turn-arounds: MI expects to invest $300K-$500K in four high growth turn
around deals.
3. Early Stage/Development: Murex Investments intends to invest in six to
eight early stage companies at an average of $75K-$150K and to utilize its
grant funding for technical support significantly in this category of
business.
4. Expansion/ESOP's: MI will invest $300K-$600K per deal in six to eight
expansion/ESOP deals.
Fund 11 has several key differences from Fund I. First, unlike Fund I, Fund 11 is
funded by a mix of debt and equity investment, all anticipating some type of
return on investment. The government investors (local and state) anticipate, at a
minimum, return of their capital. The federal government anticipates a return of
principle and accrued interest on debt, local and state government investors will
32 Murex Investments internal document.
Murex Investments Fund II
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participate in any additional returns on investment. Financial institutions expect
returns comparable with the MI projections of 10-12%, and satisfaction of CRA
credit requirements. The changing investors have significantly affected the
investment strategy of Murex Investments. Where in Fund I they focused on
'very high risk' investments that had the potential to significantly satisfy MI's
social impact goals and overall philosophy, Fund II will take a more even
approach to investment. It plans to pursue some investments that are more
capable of providing higher financial returns while satisfying less of the social
mission of the Fund. This translates into a hybrid approach of investing, aiming
to have a blended return rate of 10-12%, acknowledging that some more socially
beneficial deals will be offset by more traditionally financially viable deals. 33 Fund
11 will reduce its emphasis on turn-around businesses, drawing Murex
Investments away from its original Fund development motivations.
Silicon Valley Community Ventures
Fund Development
Silicon Valley Community Ventures (SVCV) was founded in 1998 as a nonprofit
organization that manages Silicon Valley Community Ventures Investment
Partners, LLC 1. The organization began as a response to both the tremendous
wealth generated in Silicon Valley in the late 1990s and the inequality of that
economic growth. SVCV attempts to "address these inequities, by providing
Venture Capital, business advice and critical business resources to businesses in
low-income communities throughout the Bay Area"34 . Its mission is 'to invest in
and develop businesses, which provide substantial economic benefits to low
income communities." In addition to this stated mission, SVCV's work is based in
part on a philosophy of bridging gaps between different sets of people and
communities, creating new business networks among parties that have
33 Interview with Murex Investments Fund Manager March 2002.
3 SVCV Case Study presented at CDVCA conference March 2002.
previously been unknown or inaccessible to each other yet mutually beneficial 3.
SVCV provides two integrated but distinct services to the communities and
businesses it serves: 1) Investment Capital; 2) Business Advisory services.
Business Advisory services are provided by a network of pro bono business
executives/successful entrepreneurs that agree to provide long-term support and
technical assistance to businesses that qualify for the program. Currently, only
companies who participate in this program are then able to acquire SVCV equity
investment, however not all businesses assisted through this program will
receive SVCV investment. SVCV has invested $2.23M in nine Portfolio
Companies and has advised a total of forty-one companies (including those
invested in).
Investors and Investment
Silicon Valley Community Ventures Investment Partners LLC I raised a Fund of
$6.25M. $5.75M (or 92% of investment for Fund 1) came from banks and $.5M
(8%) was invested from foundations. SVCV is currently raising SVCV Investment
Partners LLC 11 and (as of late 2001) it is capitalized at $12.45M. While this fund
is not yet closed current investment/commitments are broken down as follows:
$10M from pension funds, $2M from bank investors and $.45M from individual
investors. The projected capitalization of this fund is $25M. The inclusion of a
large pension fund investment in
Silicon Valley Community Fund 11 is seen by many in the
Ventures LLC I
Community Development Venture
83 Banks Capital industry as a coup,
representing a new and deep pool of
potential investment for this industry.
That SVCV was able to secure
funding from the largest and most
highly capitalized pension fund in
3 Penelope Douglas, CEO of SVCV at CDVCA conference March 2002.
America is also seen as a positive next step in the development of CDVC
Funds. 36 SVCV is expecting a 10-15% rate of return on equity investments in
Fund 11. SVCV plans to revise its investment strategy in Fund 11 by creating a
___________________________ blended fund. SVCV will provide two
SVCV LLC 1I (as of 2001) groups of funding. Group A will
fund not closedfund ot cosedrepresent equity investments in later
stage companies and Group B will
4%
16% represent investment in earlier stage
* PensionSPansio companies, those requiring significantO Bank
* Individuals technical assistance through the
Advisory group, and will include both
80% long term convertible debt as well as
equity.37 The goal is to create a Fund
that will both provide expected rates of
return of 15% and also have the capacity to accept larger equity investments as
Fund capitalization rises. SVCV's investment strategy for Fund 11 has also
changed from Fund I as Murex Investments did. Silicon Valley Community
Ventures will take a hybrid approach such that, "Investments in high potential
companies with a high need for SVCV services, good financial and high social
return will be balanced by strong companies with high financial return potential,
little need for additional SVCV services, and good social return." 38
36 CaIPERS committed $10M in SVCV Investment Partners through its Innovative New Funds"
category within CaIPERS' "California Initiative," a $500 million private equity investment program
targeting development in California's underserved markets.
m Interview with SVCV Fund Management March 2002.
38 Interview SVCV May 2002.
Boston Community Venture Fund
Fund Development
Boston Community Venture Fund is a nonprofit CDVC established in 1996.
BCVF is an affiliate of Boston Community Capital, founded in 1985 as a
Community Loan Fund, and one of the first designated Community Development
Financial Institutions (CDFI's) in the Unites States. The affiliate, Boston
Community Loan Fund, has acted as a financial intermediary providing over
$70M in loans over the past seventeen years to organizations involved in
affordable housing and community development projects/organizations in
Massachusetts' low and moderate-income neighborhoods. BCVF's mission is an
extension of Boston Community Capital's mission to, "build healthy communities
where low-income people live and work". Boston Community Venture Fund
fulfills this mission by "providing the needed equity investment to high potential,
emerging businesses that create stable jobs, provide quality goods and supply
valuable markets which enhance the environment or reduce pollution; or that can
otherwise demonstrate a sufficiently socially responsible purpose to the
satisfaction of the Fund."3 9 Boston Community Venture Fund considers itself an
'urban community venture fund' and focused in high poverty Massachusetts
areas with its first Fund, Fund 11 however, has expanded the target geography to
all of the Northeast. Further, while BCVF's has maintained a urban/regional
target its defines this focus broadly. For example, a company may be located in
the suburbs but draw a considerable portion of its employees from nearby urban
areas; this type of business could likely be a BCVF Portfolio Company.
Boston Community Venture Fund further defines its investment philosophy.
They diligently invest in only those companies for which the social impact goals
of BCVF are satisfied 'naturally' by the business and make rational business
sense. Practically, this means BCVF is interested in Portfolio Companies who
will have some logical reason for locating within a high poverty area, or need for
3 BCVF Investment Polices and Procedure, internal document.
relatively low skilled labor. BCVF will not invest in, nor encourages, Portfolio
Companies that move to a particular location, specifically to take advantage of
BCVF or other funding opportunities. In this sense, BCVF believes it pinpoints
situations where otherwise potentially profitable businesses are explicitly left out
of the traditional equity market. They do not look to manipulate businesses to
satisfy their social impact goals.
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* While BCLF invested 40% in Fund I, the capital for this investment was obtained by receiving
loans from Boston Community Loan Fund. Several financial institutions financed this and
collectively provided $1.65M in equity equivalent notes the BCLF.
Fund 11 since year-end 2000, and has had one closing. Fund II expects full
capitalization at $20M, and currently has $15.9M committed/received and $3M in
discussion (as of April 2002). Fund II has already made four investments and
made a commitment for a fifth.
Fund I and Fund II will have several strategic differences. Already, the Fund II
investments are significantly higher than Fund I, the range of invested and
committed dollars is $200,000-$750,000, (vs. $50,00-650,000) and the minimum
investment for Fund II was raised to $100,000 and maximum raised to $1.5M.
Further, Fund 11 has established specific Portfolio Company assumptions and will
focus the bulk of its investments (52%) on growth oriented business, 27% of
capital is slated for early stage business and 21 % of capital for expansion of
businesses. This breakdown further estimates that the average investment will
be just over $1 M per company.41 These projections are based on the increased
experience of the Fund management and recognize the monitoring capacity of
each Fund partner given larger Fund capitalization. Fund 11 is a larger Fund
resulting in a change of investment focus "we [BCVF] tend to put to work larger
amounts of money per deal.. .and hence that may preclude doing deals that are
too early and/or undeveloped".42 Another difference between Funds I and 11 is the
expansion in target area. Fund II will focus 50% of its capital within
Massachusetts and 50% will be available for investment throughout the
Northeast. Finally and significantly, Boston Community Venture Fund made no
commitments for financial returns during the course of raising Fund I, however
projects an 11%-15% return as it continues to raise and invest Fund II.
One key investor change between Fund I and Fund I is the absence of individual
investors. BCVF has not pursued individual investors in Fund 11. This was done
for several reasons. First, BCVF's track record was such that larger investors
showed significant interest in investment and second, because individual
4' BCVF 11, LLC Private Placement Offering August 2000.
42 BCVF Interview May 2002.
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investors, on average, had less capital to invest. There is a sentiment that the
inclusion of large national foundations and their collective increased investment
places additional pressure in Fund 11 to clearly identify and maximize social
benefits of each investment.43 . Finally, Fund 11 has acquired investment from the
insurance industry44, introducing a new category of investor into Boston
Community Venture Fund.
43 Ibid
44 Investment made as part of the Property/Casualty Initiative which requires Massachusetts
insurance companies to make investments within the communities they serve.
Fund Comparisons
Capitalization
Fund I $5.2M $6.25M $5.2M
Fund Il (projected) $11M $25M $20M
% growth in capitalization 112% 300% 285%
Largest Limited Partner
Fund I Local Gov't Banks Banks
Fund Il (not yet closed) Fed Gov't Pension Banks
Project Financial Return
Fund I 0% 10% 0%
Fund |1 10-12% 10%-15% 11-15%
Average Invest Size
Fund I $390,000 $248,000 $470,000
Fund 11 (projected) $350,000 $1,000,000 $1,000,000
% change -10% +303% +113%
Investment Objectives
urban X X X
job creation for low income workers X X X
career training/job ladders X X X
local ownership x
worker ownership x
entreprenuerial growth x X X
support women and minorities X
environment X
investment in high poverty areas X X X
increased goods and service X
Table 6 Fund Comparisons
This chart above summarizes the three case study Funds along several lines to
illustrate some of the synergies between the Funds as well as highlight the
changing nature of CDVC Funds as seen through these organizations. First,
each Fund's capitalization will grow considerably given current Fund projections.
Murex Investments will see the lowest growth at 112% and SVCV the highest at
300%. Following this capitalization growth is a growth in investment averages for
two of the three Funds. SVCV and BCVF will raise average investments to $1 M,
an increase of over 100% for both Funds. Murex Investments will maintain the
same relative levels around $350,000. Murex Investments is in line with CDVC
industry specifications that indicate the average industry investment is $330,000,
while SVCV and BCVF will be far ahead of industry average. Additionally, all
three Funds raised the financial rate of return projections between Fund I and
Fund 11. These changing levels of investment and their potential implications for
the CDVC field will be explored in the next chapter. Finally, a review of each
Fund's stated45 investment objectives show some important synergies. All three
funds are focused on urban investments, job creation for low-income workers,
career paths/job ladders general entrepreneurial growth within their investment,
geography, and investment in high poverty areas. These synergies play a key
role in determining the types and methods of social objectives measurement that
should be completed by each Fund and the industry as a whole. Chapter four
will revisit these synergies when exploring each Fund's social return
measurements.
45 Other investment goals may play a part in investment decisions or Funds may include goals not
demarcated for them in this chart, however they are not explicitly stated in investment written
investment criteria reviewed by this Author.
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Chapter Three
Chapter three will focus on the relationships between Funds and their investors.
It will introduce data collected during a survey of CDVC Fund investors, present
key funders investment criteria discussed at the CDVCA Annual Conference
March 2002, and analyze both the potential impact of new legislation on
investment as well as the case information provided above. This section will
report on the changing nature of funding for CDVC's and explore potential effects
they may have on the CDVC's investment strategy.
Survey Methodology
The survey was administered over the Internet as a web-based survey46. The
survey was sent to twenty-three investors in urban equity focused Community
Development Venture Capital Funds. The dissemination of the survey was
limited by several factors: 1. The CDVC industry is relatively small; there are
only sixty funds and of that number only twenty-five are equity-focused funds;
2. This thesis is concerned only with urban funds, which represent about half of
all CDVC funds; 3. The funders of CDVCs are not necessarily public information,
and thus finding who they are can be an obstacle; 4. Time was a constraint.
However, given the limited number of investors contacted to participate in the
survey, the response rate of 52% (twelve investors) and completion rate of 43%
(ten investors) is respectable. Finally, the information gathered in this survey
was not intended to establish statistically significant results, but rather provide an
illustrative context from which to explore CDVC investors.
Survey Results
The survey was given out to twenty-three CDVC investors. The survey
distribution was 57% to banks/financial institutions, 39% to foundations and 4%
46 Please see Appendix 1 for an example of the Community Development Venture Capital
Investor Survey, two surveys were administered via telephone; all surveys were completed
between March 10 -April 2, 2002.
(1) to government organizations. However the completion rate did not represent
this same distribution. Survey response was 50% foundations 50%
banks/financial institutions and 0% government organizations. Finally, this
compares with overall industry funding (equity and non-equity focused Funds) of
Banks (55%), Foundations (12%), Corporations (13%), Government (13%) and
Other (7%).
Total Amount Invested $204M $12.5M $216.5M
Number of Funds Invested in 40* 8 48
% providing debt 0% 20% 10%
% providing equity 100% 60% 80%
% providing both 0% 20% 10%
Use Investment to Satisfy CRA (banks only) 100%
Use PRI's to Fund Investment (foundations only) 40%
How do you weigh your investment returns?
equal social and financial 80% 100% 90%
solely social 20% 0% 10%
solely financial 0% 0% 0%
Would you invest in a CDVC fund again?
yes 80% 100% 90%
probably 20% 0% 10%
doubtful 0% 0%
no 0% 0%_
*result is heavily skewed by two Banks which includes SBIC/SSBIC investments with CDVC
Table 7 Source Authors survey
The summary of survey results47 above indicates that Banks are more likely to
invest equity in CDVC Funds than foundations. Sixty percent of foundation
survey respondents invested equity in CDVC Funds, compared to 100% of bank
investors surveyed. This survey also indicates that Banks that do invest utilize
their investment as part of the satisfaction of Community Reinvestment Act48
investment requirements. This was further confirmed through individual
interviews with bank CRA investment officers who stated that if CDVC Funds did
47 Please see Appendix 2 for complete survey results.
48 The Community Reinvestment Act has three 'tests' a financial institution must pass in order to
receive positive ratings investment in CDVC's satisfies the investment test of CRA.
47
not qualify for CRA credit their bank would not invest in these Funds49 .
Interestingly, while almost all respondents indicated they weighed the financial
returns and social returns equally they also indicated they would invest in a
CDVC Fund again, even though evaluation of financial returns was considered
premature.
Financial rate of return expectations varied among the different respondents. The
range went from a low of 1 % interest on long-term debt to a high of 20% rate of
return on equity. This high degree of variation may indicate: 1. A diversity in the
CDVC Fund's and their ability to achieve particular returns; 2. A diversity in the
type, length and expectations of funders and their investments; 3. An over or
under estimation of the Fund's ability to achieve financial returns (either by the
Fund or the Investor). There are likely other reasons for such a wide range in
expected rates of return, however, the variety is noteworthy. The industry is still
young, and as such has not yet established a track record; this makes it difficult
for both the Fund and potential investors to make reasonable estimations of the
type and likelihood of returns. Importantly, for the CDVC industry, this variety
which thus far is not based on actual returns may also influence potential
investments toward certain 'financially high performing' Funds as stated by Fund
managers' projections. This concern was voiced by one Fund Manager who
stated, " The diversity in the type and amount of social returns that CDVC Funds
accomplish may affect their ability to achieve high financial returns, however, if
investors receive the same benefits (tax credits or CRA credits) regardless of
specific social measures, they are likely to invest in the financially high
performing Funds. This limits other funds with higher social returns but lower
financial returns from attracting these investors.50" The diversity in expected
financial rates of return was also noted as a key challenge in investing in CDVC
Funds. One bank investor during a phone interview stated that their institution is
working to create a financial returns matrix to better evaluate the types of returns
4 Interviews conducted at CDVCA Annual Conference March 4-6.
50 interview with Murex Investments Fund Manager.
it should expect from CDVCs. Currently they use long-term Venture Capital rates
of return as their benchmark.
Most respondents indicated that CDVC Funds had made investments that 'met
expected social goals'. However, one investor responded that the CDVC Fund
had fallen short of social goals and another stated the Fund had exceeded
expected social goals. This indicates that thus far investors feel that CDVC
funds have been able to meet the types of social goals they state they will reach.
Last, there were some further indications of differences between financial
institutions and foundations. Two indicators were expected financial returns and
primary social returns desired. Foundations responded that their expected rates
of financial returns were between 1 % and 10%. One percent return expectation
was on debt and expectations for equity investment ranged from 5-10%. Banks,
on the other hand, provided only equity and their expected rates of return were
between 10-20%. Even when taking out differing return expectations for debt
and equity, foundations still peaked at a 10% expected return on equity, versus
banks whose minimum was a 10% return on equity. This is an important
difference because, as identified by the CDVCA, financial institutions are the
primary growing investor pool for CDVCs. The growth of banks may then
increase the pressure for CDVC Funds to provide higher financial rates of return.
These higher return expectations likely require CDVCS to invest in higher growth
industries that may or may not be aligned with social return objectives.
Second, there was an interesting difference in the primary social objective of
investments between foundations and banks. Foundations were most likely to
cite job creation as the primary social driver for investment, yet banks most often
cited the expansion of women and minority businesses owners as the primary
driver. This is interesting in light of the three case study Funds. All three
consider investment in minority and women owned business a positive aspect of
investment, but only BCV incorporates this social objective explicitly in its
investment strategy. It is not clear whether the objective of increased minority
business ownership is widespread across the CDVC and banking industries. It
may reflect banks' history of investment in SSBICs as a satisfaction of their CRA
requirement, which does target entrepreneurs of color, or if as noted by one bank
respondent, "investment in communities of color and businesses owned by
people of color is seen by the [Bank] as serving our overall strategic goals. We
see the growth of these communities, especially within our footprint, and want to
create more opportunities for them to become our customers."51 Whatever the
motivation the apparent disconnects between Fund objectives and investor
objectives is necessary to address as CDVCs rely more heavily on financial
institutions as Limited Partners.
Survey Comments
Qualitatively, the survey left room for investors to make comments about the
CDVC industry and their investment in it. These comments provide insight into
how investors make their investment decisions and the methods they utilize to
evaluate these investments. Some investors seem primarily interested in
understanding whether CDVC Funds represent a sustainable method of
community development investment:
"In addition to the potential job creation benefits, these investments
demonstrate the job and enterprise creation potential of the CDVC model"
'Within the next few years the organization intends to spend another
$17M in this area (CDVC) to further test this model."
"It will be some time before we are able to assess the extent that these
investments have yielded expected social and financial returns."
Other investors see the industry as simply another way to satisfy their investment
requirements.
"Our primary purpose is to make CRA qualified investments to meet the
investment test of the CRA examination."
Finally, several investors indicate that they are beginning to treat the industry as
a more mature investment model, and therefore are looking for these Funds to
51 Interview March 2002 with Bank CRA Vice President
increase professionalism within the industry and meet expectations both
financially and socially.
"Besides fulfilling our social mission, we've seen many current CDVC
Funds with more seasoned Fund managers. This is the main reason
we're interested in investing in CDVC Funds."
"Previously, investments in CDVC Funds have been primarily motivated
by social returns, however, moving forward more emphasis will be placed
on the financial returns of CDVC Funds. We will shift the weight of our
evaluation to about 70% based on financial returns. Further future
investments will be made more selectively and on the basis of strong fund
management. The key driver in our investment will be the Funds' ability to
meet expected financial goals."
'What Funds advertise as their social mission and what they legally agree
to is often quite different. The broadness of the legal requirements allows
funds to justify investments as social investments. It is very difficult to
define social impact. We view co-investment with traditional VC's as
CDVC's losing their niche. CDVC Funds sold the idea of financial returns,
based on an untapped market, this was supposed to increase likelihood
of financial returns, but so far this hasn't panned out."
The comments made by investors speak to the range of motivations they may
have for investment. As confirmed by survey responses, it seems fair to assume
that the investors who participated expect to continue, at least for the time being,
their investment in CDVC Funds. Some are waiting to see if the model 'pans out'
and if financial returns are truly achievable. There is indication of investors'
expectations for an increased professionalism of the trade, an entrance of
experienced Fund managers in the market and seeing this development as a key
to continued investment. These comments also speak to the move of some
investors from looking primarily (or equally) at the social and financial returns to
concentrating more heavily on the financial returns of this industry. Finally, there
is some question that arises both for the industry's ability to define social impact
of their investments as well as the degree to which these Funds have made a
commitment to particular social goals. This raises the question of whether, given
the increased financial return expectations of investors, Funds will be able to
commit to meeting specified social goals. Or, as noted by one investor, if Funds
will maintain or increase the definition of what satisfies social return criteria to
satisfy financial return projections.
CDVCA Access to Capital Panel52
During the annual Community Development Venture Capital Alliance conference
March 2002, a panel discussion of CDVC funders discussed their background
investing in CDVCs as well as the criteria they look for when making
investments. The panel included representatives from Fleet Bank, JPMorgan
Chase, the MacArthur Foundation and HB Heron Foundation. Their comments
are helpful to understand the criteria by which investors evaluate potential CDVC
fund investments and how these key industry players see the future of CDVC
investments.
Fleet Bank through its Community Banking Division invests between $30-$40M
annually in a variety of 'community development ventures within its nine state
footprint'. Fleet has made investments in four CDVC's, Coastal Ventures in
Maine, The Reinvestment Fund in Philadelphia, Boston Community Ventures and
NYCIC, in New York City. Fleet discussed the primary indicators they look for
when deciding to make an investment in CDVCs:
1. Key management team (number 1 priority is track record)
2. Potential deal flow and unmet capital need
3. Experience
4. Relationship
JP Morgan Chase makes community development investments in SBIC's and
real estate funds as well as CDVCs. They have invested in three CDVCs:
NYCIC, Boston Community Ventures LLC II and The Reinvestment Fund. They
require that any investment made is CRA eligible and they will invest in Funds
only if they have a minimum capitalization of $15M.
Chase's primary indicators for investment include:
1. Community development impact (CRA eligibility, wealth creation, place
based, job creation)
52 All information in the section comes from the Author's notes during the CDVCA Annual
Conference March 4-6 2002.
2. Investment strategy -stage orientation, target industries, average
investment size well defined, role as investors, exit strategy, deal sourcing
3. Management team (background, track record, full time team, turnover)
4. Financial return expectations (level of social impact derives amount of
expected financial return, minimum return 10%)
5. Investment within footprint New York, New Jersey & Texas primary, mid
Atlantic and northeast secondary.
The MacArthur Foundation has invested in three CDVC Funds, Sustainable
Jobs Fund, Northeast Ventures and Kentucky Highlands. They utilize their
Program Related Investment (PRIs) allocation for CDVC investments. The
Foundation expects to invest $20M in CDVCs over the next 2-3 years, however,
it will move away from rural oriented funds towards more urban focused Funds.
They intend to provide $1OM that will go to established leaders in field $1OM
available for new urban focused Funds. The foundation's investment goal is to
see funds prove out their double bottom line hypothesis, grow to scale, create
viable exit strategies and significant community impact. The MacArthur
Foundation's investment requirements look at two key areas.
1. How the CDVC expects to achieve social impact including detailed
mechanics of how they will be achieved and track record of social impact
2. Past achievement of the organization within their given field
Finally, the HB Heron Foundation sees investment in CDVC Funds as
furthering the Foundation's core mission of wealth creation. They have invested
$8M in CDVC Funds including Coastal Ventures, Self Help Ventures and BCV.
HB Heron looks for a well defined and appropriate:
1. Exit strategy
2. Measurement of social impact
3. Financial return
In addition, HB Heron requires Funds to target low to moderate income, seek to
monitor social impact, include management with venture experience, have
internal capital at risk, verifiable networks to mainstream venture capital,
fundraising ability and an investment strategy appropriate to the targeted market.
The Foundation believes that expansion of the funder pool will not occur until the
CDVC model is proven. However, they have made Fund 11 investments based
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on extensive portfolio evaluation and the likelihood of realized returns. Last, they
believe that it is the Fund's responsibility to create the measurements for social
return and then utilize them, however they have not yet seen appropriate social
impact tools developed by most of the industry.
Legislation and New Capital
In December 2000, two important pieces of legislation affecting the CDVC
industry were passed5 3 . The first, administered through the CDFI Fund in the
Department of Treasury, is the New Market Tax Credit (NMTC) program intended
to stimulate private capital investment in projects that will facilitate economic and
community development in poor rural and inner city neighborhoods. Investment
is encouraged through tax credits. This program has been funded at $15B in tax
credits to be distributed over a course of seven years, beginning in 2002. The
assumption is that by increasing the after tax return on investment, investors will
be presented with a lower risk/higher return offering. This, in turn, will increase
levels of investment, as well as introduce new investors to investment in
community/economic development projects.
Tax Credits Portfolio Compan
Allocations
Community
Development
Venture Capital P Compa
Fund
TaxACredits
Portfolio Compan
New Markets Tax Credit Capital Flow
s3 Community Renewal Tax Relief Act 9 Public Law 106-554, code 45D of the IRS Code.
.... .... :-
The program is administered through designated Community Development
Entities (CDEs); most Community Development Venture Capital Funds qualify as
CDE's. There are several regulations in place stipulating the use of these tax
credits.
1. All projects invested in must be completed in communities that have a
20% poverty rate or are 80% of the metropolitan or state median
income (whichever is greater).
2. Within the first seven years of investment all capital from investments
must be used substantially for eligible purposes (e.g. no more than
15% of invested capital can be utilized for administrative costs), an
investor may not cash out of their investment and the organization
must maintain its CDE designation and its investments must maintain
their community benefit.
Discussions with case study CDVC Funds, as well as with the National
Community Capital Association, (the trade organization for all CDFI's) indicates
that the tax credit is not likely a useful tool for the industry. Two of the three
Funds view the regulatory stipulations of the tax credit as significant obstacles
that inhibit then from taking advantage of the tax credit. The major impediments
are the recapture requirement and the mandatory investments timeline. An
interview with National Community Capital, the CDFI National trade organization,
revealed the sentiment that, "NMTC works well for commercial real estate; real
estate is by its nature place-based and requires long term investment, yet its
applicability to CDVC is unclear."
The second piece of legislation passed in December 2000 is the New Markets
Venture Capital (NMVC) program. This $180M program, administered by the
SBA, provides capital to for-profit investment funds whose objective is to promote
economic development, wealth creation and new jobs in low-income areas. The
SBA requires that Funds invest equity capital in smaller enterprises"4. The SBA
provides up to $7.5M in long-term debt to a designated NMVC Fund along with
$1.65M in grants for technical assistance to Portfolio Companies. A designated
NMVC organization then must raise a minimum of $5.5M to match the SBA loan
and another $1.65M to match the SBA grant. Currently, there are seven NMVC
designated funds, and all are raising their matching commitments to meet the
year-end 2002 deadline. The SBA anticipates providing funding for a total of
fifteen NMVC funds through this legislation.
The New Markets Venture Capital program could have several potential effects
on Community Development Venture Capital. First, the introduction of a large
amount of debt may significantly alter the way Funds manage their capital.
Although NMVC regulations do not require payment on debt during the first five
years of the Fund, it requires interest payments during years six through ten and
a principle balloon payment at the end of year ten. These payments on interest
will, of course, come prior to any returns received from equity investors and may
affect a Fund's ability to make those retums. These payments are, like any other
debt, scheduled and as such do not take into account the position of the Fund.
For example, if a Fund anticipates several profitable exits in year eight, but has to
make payments on debt in year six and year seven prior to exit, a potential
capital conflict arises. Additionally, if a Fund chooses to manage its capital to
establish a reserve in anticipation of their debt payments they may constrain their
ability to make initial or follow-on investments in Portfolio Companies, which
could reduce that company's ability to gain profitability. Effectively, a Fund would
have to reserve 32.5% of its SBA debenture to secure its ability to repay its debt
at the five year deferred deadline.
NMVC has also been criticized as an approach that has been tried before and
has had limited success. Professor Timothy Bates55 has been a primary source
of research on SSBIC's (MESBICs) and evaluates New Market Venture Capital
54 The SBA defines smaller enterprises as companies with a net worth of $6M or below and
annual net profits not exceeding $2M.
s5 Timothy Bates, Distinguished Professor Wayne State University: An analysis of the SSBIC
program: Problems and Prospects 1996. The Minority Enterprise Small Business Investment
Company Program: Institutionalizing A Nonviable Minority Business Assistance Infrastructure
1997.
in light of his past research. He writes, "The SBA's emphasis on providing
debenture financing to equity-investing CDFI's-whether the MESBICs in the past
or the NMVCs of the future-highlights a basic incongruity between the objective
of venture-capital investing and the incentives that such funding creates."56
Bates adds, "because (NMVC's) niche is earlier stage small businesses relative
to SSBICs and mainstream venture capital firms, NMVC investments are riskier
and more likely to take longer to reach maturity than the five to seven year
industry wide norm. It is quite possible that NMVCs, after five years of operation,
will have few if any equity investments that are ready for acquisition or sale to
investors; most may still be immature investments. Yet, at the five-year point, all
of the deferred interest on the NMVC debenture financing from SBA comes
due."57
Bates also notes significant accounting issues that arise with the NMVC debt
capitalization. Although repayment of debt is deferred for the first five years, the
deferred interest is accrued annually; this accrual is reflected on a Fund's income
statement, reducing net income; and as a liability on the balance sheet it lowers a
Fund's net worth. This combination of Fund capital reductions, Bates believes,
will create challenges for Funds attempting to raise money from outside
investors.
The key challenge that arises for the CDVC industry from either program is the
shift towards increased government involvement and subsequently the
increasing regulatory nature of these Funds. One of the key strengths of
CDVC's, noted by several Fund Managers, is the unregulated nature of
Community Development Venture Capital, which has been referred to as a 'tool
of the industry.'58 If Funds rely on the tax credits or SBA debt to raise capital
their fund management will be forced to adhere to these growing rules and
56 Bates, Timothy 2002: "Government as Venture Capital Catalyst: Pitfalls and Promising
Ayproaches" Economic Development Quarterly Vol. 16 No I February 2002
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restrictions. CDVCs currently are a diverse group, and define their success
differently, invest in different types and stages of business and have varied social
goals. NMTC/NMVC, if heavily utilized, may establish a direction for the CDVC
industry that provides it with less flexibility to achieve self-defined success
measure. The flip side, however, could be a clarified process for accountability
of CDVC funds, which receive government, foundation and CRA guided bank
investments to ensure that the social goals are clearly articulated, measurable
and are indeed being met. Whichever outlook the industry takes it is necessary
to evaluate the influence of government involvement on individual funds as well
as the industry.
Changing Face of Investors-A Fund's Perspectives
The three organizations discussed in chapter two have distinct origins,
investments philosophies and varying future prospects, yet all three fall under the
umbrella of Community Development Venture Capital. As such, they all have
made a commitment to fulfill the credo of the double bottom line, requiring
financial and social returns, on their investments. This thesis is concerned with
exploring how these Funds have been able or propose to measure their ability to
fulfill the social bottom line of their investment. One area to investigate is the
influence investors may have on the Funds they invest in. While the Venture
Capital model is established in such as a way to exclude Limited Partners (or
investors in Funds) from participating in the actual investment decisions made by
General Partners (Fund management), it has been recognized that investors
influence fund management in traditional Venture Capital.
In traditional Venture Capital the implied pressure from investors is for a private
equity firm to maximize its profits and therefore the returns it provides its Limited
Partners. The potential pressure of investors then is closely aligned with the
mission of the traditional VC. However, actions of investors can still affect a
private equity firm's ability to make and manage investments. One example has
been the increased investment made by pension funds into Venture Capital.
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Practically, the larger investment size made by pension funds has moved venture
capitalization to higher levels (see trends in Venture Capital Chapter 1); this has,
in turn, required venture funds to make larger investments. Venture funds now
focus on businesses that have the capacity to accept large amounts of equity,
$7-20M, rather than the smaller amounts Venture Capital previously provided.
This changes the types and stages of businesses that venture funds can target,
and provides a reasonable example of how, within the LLC model, LPs can affect
fund management.
Is it realistic then to expect that Limited Partners in CDVC Funds may influence
the types of investments funds make? At a cursory level it seems reasonable
given the traditional Venture Capital experience and CDVC's emulation of that
model. An examination of the three cases provides indications that the nature of
LP investment may effect General Partner investments. The three Funds
discussed above have changing LPs as they raise their second fund.
Murex and NMVC
Murex Investments will rely on the federal government for half of its fund capital.
This is expected to have several effects on the management of the fund. First,
the New Markets Venture Capital program will involve, like most government
programs, a significant amount of paperwork and recording. This will affect MI's
management. Currently, MI's three person staff does not rely heavily on
monitoring to assess the social impact of its investments. The close relationship
it maintains with its Portfolio Companies creates an environment where MI
management feels they 'know' the impact their investments have made.
Additionally, because they are interested in multiple factors that create their
social impact criteria they have relied on anecdotes and stories to convey the
social impact of their investments. However, the increased reporting
requirements will require a considerable amount of MI's staff time. The Fund's
investment strategy is based on providing intensive technical assistance yet this
may be compromised by additional administrative tasks necessary to utilize the
NMVC capital given the limited human resources of the Fund.
As discussed above, the structure of NMVC is a debenture to be repaid over the
course of ten years with interest deferred until year five and a balloon principle
payment at year ten. This debt structure will dramatically change the investment
strategy of MI. MI's first fund was 100% grant money, allowing them time and
flexibility to target difficult turn-around businesses. In fact, after four years MI has
invested only $2.75M of the total $5.2M they raised. If MI was utilizing NMVC
capital now they would have to make cumulative interest payments within a year
and likely would draw this from their capitalization, given they have not yet exited
any of their businesses. This reduces the overall capital Murex could commit to
Portfolio Companies and potentially reduces the social impact the Fund can
make. This is further highlighted by the new investment strategy of MI described
in chapter two which refocuses its strategy away from primarily turn-around
businesses, to devoting a maximum of $2M (18%) out of their $11 M Fund toward
this type of investment, versus almost 100% of Fund I devoted to turn-arounds.
MI will also look to co-invest in more traditional VC in more traditional 'looking'
deals that locate within their target area to address this quicker investment
timeline. MI recognizes that these investments may have reduced social benefits,
outside of location in low-income neighborhoods. Another key change based on
the changing nature of Fund capitalization is the projected financial rates of
return. MI made none for Fund I, and has projected returns between 10-12% for
Fund II. These changes to MI are more than simply administrative. The original
goals of Murex Investments, while ideal, were to forward principles of worker-
ownership, local ownership and moving towards a financial self-sustaining
community in the imitation of Mondragon Cooperatives in Spain. The degree to
which Murex strays from this philosophy may establish a more credible CDVC
but may lose its philosophy, core strategy (high levels of technical assistance)
and degree of social impact along the way.
Pension Funds, Hybrid Investment and SVCV
Silicon Valley Community Ventures was highly capitalized in Fund I by banks.
They seem, in this respect, to have been ahead of the trend of increased bank
activity in the CDVC trade. However, SVCV recently received an investment from
CaIPERS, the California state workers pension fund. CaIPERS has over $150B it
invests in a variety of assets. In 2001, CaIPERS began a program to make
investments in California emerging markets (rural and inner city markets) totaling
$475M, $10M of which was committed to SVCV. Many in the CDVC industry
have viewed this investment as a coup. Industry experts hope this investment is
an indicator of the future involvement in pension funds in the CDVCs. Viewing
this investment as an introduction of this 'category' of investor to CDVC's is likely
premature, because CaIPERS made this commitment as part of a particular
socially motivated program. The degree to which other pension funds will follow
suit and make socially motivated investments does not seem a foregone
conclusion. Rather, it may present an opportunity for advocacy on the part of the
CDVC industry to lobby statewide pension funds. The rationale may be similar to
the one used to justify Community Reinvestment Act capital requirements.
However, the pursuit of pension fund money must also be balanced with a
reasonable assessment of how it could affect the industry. For a large pension
fund an investment of $1OM is relatively small, and may indicate the type of
minimum investment feasible. Are CDVC Funds in a position to accept this
investment amount, which is larger than the industry average? Would the
entrance of pension funds into the CDVC market increase average capitalization
of Funds? Are the types of companies they invest in now the same companies
that would be able to accept equity investments comparable with these
potentially higher capitalization? If not, how do social impacts change?
SVCV already has established that the types of deals it participated in Fund I will
not be the same types of deals it will participate in Fund II, "the deals in the first
Fund were just too expensive, given high due diligence and low financial returns
and aren't going to be done in Fund I"59. Instead, SVCV will take a hybrid
approach to investment. Group A investments will be companies with $20M plus
in revenues in need of equity for expansion and growth. Group B investments
will be companies that need up to about $.5M and likely in the form of convertible
debt. This hybrid method of investment is SVCV's approach to dealing with the
high cost and risk-adjusted returns of previous investments. The goal is a
blended return to meet the projected 15% return rates. They believe they will still
be able to further their mission, however, the mainstay of investments moving
forward will be with later stage companies.
Increased Capitalization and Increased Expectations: BCVF
Boston Community Venture Fund is also moving toward a larger capitalization for
Fund II, and thus larger investments. Fund II will likely close between $18-20M.
Their investors have changed in several respects from Fund I to Fund II. Fund I
gathered much of its capital from local foundations and individuals. Fund 11
however, is drawing capital from national foundations and has not pursued
individual donors. Additionally the strategy, along with growing the fund size
from $5M in LLC I to $20M in LLC II, is to raise minimum investments from about
$50,000 to $500,000 in Fund 11. This strategy will therefore have significant
affects on the type of businesses BCVF invests in, and in what type of
investment they will participate. BCVF will not be taking a 'hybrid' approach to
investing, as is the trend with SVCV and Mi. BCVF feels it will be able to
maintain its adherence to its social mission regardless of the increased
investment size. The idea is basic. Invest larger amounts in larger businesses,
within specified socially beneficial industry sectors or communities, and you are
able to affect more people, and create or retain larger number of jobs. The
question still remains however; will BCVF be fulfilling a niche? Will they be
addressing businesses that would be unable to attract equity from other market
players, particularly SBIC's? A BCVF manager stated, "we may compete [or
partner] with SBIC's for a small portion of our deals, perhaps the top 20%, which
5 Interview with SVCV Fund Manager March 2002
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would represent perhaps the bottom 20% of an SBIC's deal; this is not a negative
prospect" 0 . BCVF contends that because they still intend to concentrate on
historically slower growth sectors underserved by traditional VCs, they will still
address distinct capital gaps. A second key distinction between Fund I and Fund
11 is BCVF projected financial returns. Fund I made none, however, Fund II has
projected returns of approximately 11-15%. This, as a matter of course, adds
additional pressure to BCVF to make investments that will satisfy the financial
return expectations made. Fund Managers believe that their experience and
larger investments will make this a reality. A secondary goal of these financial
projections is to establish a track record of financial returns. It is believed that if
they are able to meet the financial expectations, they will effectively move
towards creating a new asset class. If BCVF is able to provide financial returns
between 11 %-15%, they believe it will provide a new class of investments for
foundation's PRIs, social investors, and attractive investment for banks,
regardless of CRA satisfaction. Further, this strategy plays into the Fund's goals
of achieving financial sustainability, being able to manage the Fund without any
grant contributions.
60 Interview with BCVF Manager March 2002
Investment Trends
Several trends become apparent by looking at both the funders and the cases:
1. Larger capitalization of funds
2. Increased focus on financial returns: by investors and fund managers
3. Hybrid approach to investing and later stage investments
4. Increased professionalism within industry
5. Increased bank Limited Partners
6. Introduction of federal government: increased debt and regulations
These trends, if proven true, require that CDVC evaluate their double bottom line
model of investment. Larger capitalization of Funds means a movement into a
new category of equity investments for many Funds. How does this change who
their Portfolio Companies are? Does this change the type, level or degree of
social impact? Are they fulfilling the same niche, or will they move into the realm
of SBIC's, who arguably have more experience, higher capitalization and proven
track records of success? Could these movements into this larger market place
them at a competitive disadvantage? What effect does the move towards
increased bank participation have? Will Funds be limited by satisfying banks
investment motivations, e.g. Portfolio Companies within bank footprints, or
demands for higher financial retums? Table 8 below looks at potential positive
and negative ramifications of these trends. These changing investors' trends can
have several potential effects on the industry. First, the move toward higher
capitalization will likely lead to an increase in investing in later stage companies
that have the capacity to accept higher investments from the Funds. This moves
CDVC Funds away from their original niche of early stage businesses (see VC
model comparisons chapter one). This move may also refocus the industry on
the retention of jobs rather than the creation of employment. Other ramifications
of later stage investment may include: the failure of CDVC Funds to expand the
entrepreneurial landscape (e.g. women and minorities) by targeting established
companies and reduced likelihood of spurring real estate development and focus
instead on neighborhood stability. The increased capitalization also moves
CDVCs further into the realm of SBICs in terms of the investment size, it also
influenced MI and SVCV's to take a hybrid investment approach competing for
similar types of VC deals. This places CDVCs in a position where they must
compete with more experienced, and perhaps better managed Funds. Increased
co-investment may also reduce the Funds' ability to incorporate social return
expectations on the firms in which they invest. The added reliance on
government debt, through the NMVC program positions CDVCs to struggle with
an inevitable conflict between the expectations of their debt investors and their
abilities to function as equity investors in their Portfolio Companies. Finally, the
trend toward increased bank participation could add limitations requiring Funds to
focus within the banks' footprint, increase the pressure for financial returns and
have their funding be at the whim of legislation which potentially can overturn or
revise the CRA regulations.
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The CDVC industry is still at a relatively early stage where its development path
is open to take a variety of directions. There is a distinct need for the CDVCA,
industry managers, investors, outside researchers and practitioners to make key
decisions, evaluations and critiques about what it means to pursue a double
bottom line and how to create a mechanism that does that most effectively. The
industry has been to some degree limited by its youth; many of the ideas and
ideals have to still pan out. I contend it is important to remain critical of this model
until it is proven. The capital invested by banks, foundations and other social
investors are dollars that would likely be invested in other community
development projects, given they are often PRI's, grants or CRA related
investments. An increased level of critique must be incorporated into the current
discussion around the effectiveness of this industry. CDVCs Funds are funded
by socially motivated capital and so must be evaluated in such a manner that
recognizes the potential impact of that capital in other investments. This has not
yet occurred.
This report will now turn to the second area of investigation; the social returns of
Community Development Venture Capital Funds.
Chapter Four
This thesis is interested in how the CDVC model of community investment is able
to address the social return component of the double bottom line approach the
industry utilizes. It is both beyond the scope of this thesis, as well as premature,
given the CDVC's development stage to quantitatively address the social impact
of the industry, or even the three case study organizations. This paper will,
however, attempt to review social returns on investment qualitatively. This
chapter will lay out the social impact criteria evaluated by each case study Fund,
the methods used to gather social impact information and the results of this data
gathering. Next, it will explore information that was provided during CDVC Fund
case interviews to gain a deeper understanding of the Fund's approach to social
impact data gathering. This section will then provide recommendations to move
the CDVC industry toward a more thorough and rigorous evaluation of its social
returns. Finally, I will conclude with a discussion about why social impact data is
vital to the industry as well as a rationale for the immediate increased attention
paid to this area of the industry.
Murex Investments
The stated mission of Murex Investments is to invest in companies that transform
distressed areas by maximizing social and financial returns for investors,
entrepreneurs and employees. They are interested in several measurements of
social impact: 1. Maintaining local ownership of businesses; 2. Living wage job
creation; 3. Increasing management proficiencies and 4. Increasing opportunities
for employee ownership. Murex Investments monitors job creation information
annually but does not systematically evaluated Portfolio Companies progress in
its other social impact indicators. They do, however collect this information on an
ad hoc basis. They believe that their 'close relationships with Portfolio
Companies ensures they have a clear understanding of how each company is
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doing"6 1 regarding the various measures. Murex Investments estimates that it
has created and/or retained 200 jobs through its Portfolio Companies; Murex
Investments also sets a floor wage of $7.90 for all employees of its Portfolio
Companies. This is $2.70 above the Pennsylvania minimum wage of $5.15 but
below the proposed area living wage of $11 per/hour. Additionally, one out of the
seven Portfolio Companies is minority owned (African American). The Funds
designation as a New Market Venture Capital Fund will require however that the
organization establish much more formal social impact measurements.
Specifically, new monitoring will include annual reports indicating an assessment
of the FTE jobs created, the impact of financing on revenues and profits of the
Portfolio Company, taxes paid by the firm and its employees, and a record of
employees living within low income census tracts. NMVC regulations require that
80% of all investments must be made to Portfolio Companies residing in a low-
income geographic area. The low income eligible area is defined as one with a
minimum of 20% poverty, at least 50% of families within the tract have below
60% of the area median income, and/or within empowerment/EZ zones.
Silicon Valley Community Ventures
Silicon Valley Community Venture's mission is to: invest in and develop
businesses, which provide substantial economic benefits to low-income
communities. It measures its ability to reach this mission through the
administration of two surveys to Portfolio Companies. In 2000 SVCV worked with
outside consultants to develop a social measurement tool. This tool is now
administered with Portfolio Companies providing data on a quarterly basis62 .
Portfolio Companies (both invested in and advised) submit measurement
information via fax. The measurement focuses on three primary social impact
criteria: high quality employment opportunities in low income communities,
strategically located businesses that can help fuel community development; and
61 Interview with MI fund Manager March 2002.
6 Due to privacy issues SVCV did not share an example of the actual survey.
investing in entrepreneurs who are role models in their communities. This
measurement distinguishes employment generated by Portfolio Companies by
specifying 'designated employees'; "An employee is considered a 'designated
employee' if:
1) s/he was hired in an entry-level position with a starting salary of
equal to or less than ($x/hour) or in a managerial position with a
starting salary equal to or less than ($y per year), AND s/he was
hired from a non-profit organization, job training program, or
welfare-to-work agency
OR
2) S/he was hired in an entry-level position with a starting salary
equal to or less than ($z/hour) or in a managerial position with a
starting salary of less than ($w/hour) AND s/he resides in a
designated neighborhood (LMI zip codes within the Bay area) 3
Silicon Valley Community Ventures has tracked job creation and 'designated
employee' information since the spring of 2000. All information below is for the
time 4/1/2000 through 12/31/2001.
Total Designated Employees Hired 350
Total Designated Employees Leaving 252
"Net New"66 Designated Employees 98
63 Information from interview with SVCV March 2002. For the wages and salaries, they are arrived
at through discussion with the companies. The zip codes were determined by which zip codes in
the cities of San Francisco, Oakland, San Jose, and East Palo Alto overlapped with LMI census
tracts. For any given portfolio company, a 3.5 mile buffer zone was incorporated. The wage
levels (WXYZ) are negotiated with each Company.
64 Including those employed 4/1/00 or the time of investment, in addition to those hired.
65 There is some overlap between years - many employees were employed during both years.
66 "Net new" employees' number does not represent a "retention" number. SVCV does not have
employee level data that states, for any employee who left, when that employee was hired. They
SVCV's measurement tool is the only one from the reviewed cases that
systematically attempts to identify the characteristics of the jobs created, and
provides, net job creation numbers. Gathering net job creation data gives a more
realistic approximation of job created than the other two Funds that do not do this
type of analysis. While Silicon Valley Community Ventures has established a
comparatively rigorous measurement process to monitor achievement of their
primary social impact goal, job creation, they do not set specific goals or hurdles
for companies to reach particular job creation goals. "In general, it is unlikely that
we [SVCV] would require a company to hire a certain number of people.
However, we are explicit about our mission and goals in that area, and we would
not be involved with a company if our services and/or investment were not likely
to help them hire or retain a significant number of designated employees." 67
To further the Fund's goals of creating good quality jobs they retain a consultant
that helps companies set up wealth-sharing programs for employees. Finally,
depending on the particular deal, the term sheet (a document, which specifies
the roles and responsibilities of parties in the investments,) could include one or
more of the following stipulations:
1. Provide a specific type of training to employees;
2. Provide a wealth sharing vehicle to employees;
3. Work with a local workforce development program if it is not able to hire low-
income employees from surrounding neighborhoods.
SVCV administers a second survey annually68 .This survey attempts to collect
information on employer practices and includes information on wages and
benefits as well as employee training. According to the 2001 Annual Report all
designated employees within SVCV Portfolio Companies earn above the
minimum wage. SVCV companies have an average wage of $10.55per/hour;
have surveyed companies, however, to guesstimate average retention for entry-level positions:
64% of portfolio companies state entry-level retention at a minimum of 12 months.
67 Interview SVCV staff March 2002.
68 The first survey was administered in 2001.
this is higher than both the minimum wage of $6.75per/hour and the area living
wage of $10 per/hour69.
While minority and women ownership is not a driving factor for social impact
measures for SVCV three of the nine Portfolio Companies are minority owned
(1 Latina, 1 African American and 1 Asian American owned).
Anecdotally, SVCV's investment in Just Deserts, a producer of premium quality
bakery products for retail and wholesale distribution, is an example of
comprehensive social returns on investment. Post investment Just Deserts
constructed a new home for its manufacturing and distribution center which
employees fifty workers (mostly blue collar) in East Oakland. The creation of this
new facility in Oakland represented new commercial development in a census
tract that has a poverty level of 25%, is 97% minority and 43% of the population
is below area median family income. Just Deserts retained most of its original
employees (95%) by providing 'relocation packages', including a transportation
subsidy, relocation expenses and a cash bonus for those who chose to make the
move from San Francisco to Oakland. These employees also benefited from a
higher minimum wage. The Oakland Living wage requires a $9.25 per/hour
wage representing an increase from the Just Deserts original minimum wage.
This relocation translated into a higher wage for current employees (plus
defrayed relocation costs and ongoing transportation subsidy), provided
commercial real estate development in a high poverty tract in Oakland, and also
opens up the possibility of new employment being filled by local East Oakland
residents.
Providing comprehensive assessment, incorporating indicators like, real estate
creation/rehabilitation in high poverty areas, increased property taxes, wage rate
increases and community perception creates a more well-rounded and versatile
approach to understanding the impact of CDVC investment. Methods to quantify
69 Executive Summary of Comprehensive Assessment, SVCV April 2002.
and compare these types of social impact indicators would propel the industry
into a deeper understanding of its impact and ultimately provide lessons to more
effectively continue the practice of double bottom line investment.
Boston Community Venture Fund
BCVFs investment principles state that, "although the Fund views job creation as
a primary indicator of social return, the Fund will also invest in businesses that
provide quality goods and services to low income communities or other
disadvantaged populations; that are headed by minority or women or other
underrepresented populations; that enhance the stability of low income
neighborhoods; that produce, distribute or sell products in demonstrated services
to low income communities"70 . BCVF does not impose particular mission driven
policies on a business; as a result it requires no minimum satisfaction of job
creation or other social benefit goals. BCVF monitors the progress of its social
goals by requiring Portfolio Companies to provide quarterly job creation and
wage information. BCVF is required by the CDFI Fund (one of its contributors) to
report on the accomplishment of several goals. Goals 1 and 2 refer to the ability
of BCVF to raise and disburse capital. Goal 3, as identified by the CDFI Fund, is
to "stimulate job growth by helping to meet the investment needs of businesses
that build healthy communities in part through offering opportunities for decent
jobs to low income people".71 The total number of people employed by Portfolio
Companies' is the measure of this goal; this number, however, does not
disaggregate jobs created, jobs retained and jobs specifically filled by low-
moderate income people. In March 2002 BCVF reported 1008 full time
equivalent employees were working in positions created or retained in Portfolio
Companies72. This number includes at least 360 jobs placed by a Portfolio
Company whose primary business is the permanent placement of welfare
recipients and other low-income people in employment. BCVF also maintains
70 BCV Investment Policies and Procedures, internal document.
71 BCLF Ventures, Inc. Annual Report for Awardee, March 2001.
records for the average salary range for entry-level workers within each Portfolio
Company as well as the career ladder potential within each company. The
average salary for an entry-level position within a BCVF Portfolio Company was
$9.54 per/hour73 in March 2001. This is $2.79 per/hour above the minimum wage
($6.75) for Massachusetts but below the living wage set for Boston at $10.2574
Of the eleven investments made in Fund I, two were made to African American
owned businesses, one (exited company) was worker-owned by majority African
American and Latino employees and one investment was to an Asian American
owned business. Forty-five percent of BCVF businesses are owned by women.
Finally, BCVF does not provide or specifically encourage any job placement or
job training within its Portfolio Companies. This is noteworthy given one of its
Portfolio Companies is a welfare to work placement agency, providing potentially
a win-win situation for the individual company and the social returns on
investment. BCVF states that, "Where there is an overlap with [the placement
agency], we'd certainly make a connection, but we wouldn't force it"75. This
hands off strategy is a key factor in the BCVF investment philosophy that looks
for companies that have a social mission that emerges from their business model
and is in no way contrived by the Fund. The point of the policy is a recognition
that absent financial return, social return cannot sustainably exist.
72 BCLF Ventures Annual Report for Awardee, March 2002
7 BCLF Ventures Inc. Annual Report for Awardee, March 2001
74 www.livingwaaecampaign.org Note that over % of BCVF's Portfolio Companies are located
outside of the Boston Metropolitan area and as such a Boston Living wage may not represent the
living wage in the applicable area for each Portfolio Company.
7 Interview BCVF April 2002
Portfolio Companies 7 9 11
Fund Life (in years) 4 4 6
Jobs Created/Retained 200 463 648**
Jobs Created/Retained Annually 50 115.75 108
Jobs per Investment $$ (investment/jobs) $13,750 $4,751 $8,024
Wages
average $7.90 $10.55 $9.54
% above minimum wage 35% 36% 2
% above/below living wage -28/ 5% -7%
Minority Ownership 14% 33% 36%
Job Placement/Training Assistance YES YES NO
* BCV jobs created subtracts jobs attributed to
Portfolio Company that 'places' jobs
Table 9
This chart analyzes each Fund on its primary social objective, job creation.
BCVF has created/retained the largest number of jobs amongst the Funds;
however, Silicon Valley Community Ventures seems to create/retain jobs at a
higher rate than the other two Funds. Silicon Valley Community Ventures also
appears to have the lowest 'jobs per investment' rate of just under $5,00076.
Finally, even though BCVF is the only Fund that explicitly states increased
minority ownership as a social objective of investment, SVCV and BCVF have
similar rates of minority ownership among its Portfolio Companies. Silicon Valley
Community Ventures is the only Fund whose companies, on average, provide
higher than area living wages for its entry-level employees. BCVF Portfolio
Companies provide an average wage very close to the Boston metro area living
wage, serving as one indication of the good quality jobs its businesses
create/retain. Murex Investments, given this analysis, is the most costly of the
three Funds, providing a lower overall wage with lower rates of job creation and
minority ownership.
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Location and Impact
The following summary of Portfolio Company locations is intended to provide an
additional perspective on the potential social impacts of the three CDVC funds
and their investments. The logic is that CDVC Fund investments in high poverty,
high minority concentrated and inner city areas would represent 'unlikely'
investments in the traditional capital markets. This investment, creating new or
stabilizing places of work in the inner city, providing new or maintaining
commercial real estate, and creating or maintaining access to work for low
income communities could be seen as satisfying some of the social impact
criteria cited by each CDVC Fund, that thus far have not been extensively
monitored, with the exception of SVCV. The data77 gathered to create 'Portfolio
Company Location Summaries' comes from the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council, which is the interagency body empowered to prescribe
uniform principles, standards, and report forms for the federal examination of
financial institutions in compliance with the Community Reinvestment Act. These
data are directly related to the requirements Banks must satisfy in order to meet
their CRA investment test. This information is key given the significant
investment of Banks into CDVC Funds. These banks, as established in chapter
three, utilize CDVC Fund investments as part of the satisfaction of the CRA
investment test. The degree to which Portfolio Companies are in low and
moderate and/or high minority communities may also be important in
understanding both the CRA impact these investments make as well as guide
banks' investment decisions in CDVC Funds. The results of this analysis for the
three case study Funds are divergent. The degree to which each Fund makes
investments in Portfolio Companies that satisfy these prescribed criteria varies by
Fund.
76 The jobs created/retained are arrived at by different methodologies for each Fund, the
likelihood that these number correlate across Funds is unlikely and this data should be reviewed
for illustrative purposes only.
Murex Investments Portfolio Companies are likely to be located within low and
moderate-income census tracts, (72%). MI is the only CDVC Fund to have made
investments in a Portfolio Company located in a tract with over 50% of the
population below the poverty level. Additionally, 57% of their investments are
made in communities between 80-100% minority78 and 71 % of investments are
made within the center city.
A review of Portfolio Company locations for SVCV indicates that their
investments tend to be in low and moderate-income census tracts. Additionally,
these companies are often located within moderately high poverty areas, most
are in census tracts that have between 11-30% of its residents below the poverty
level. These companies tend to be located in minority communities; 56% of
companies are located in census tracts with an 80-100% minority population.
A summary of Portfolio Company locations indicates that BCVF Portfolio
Companies are likely to be located within middle or upper income census tracts
(63% of all Portfolio Companies in Fund 1). Sixty-four percent of BCVF Portfolio
Companies are located within low poverty areas (areas with 10% of or less
population below the poverty threshold). Finally, BCVF Portfolio Companies are
not likely to be located within high minority census tracts; 73% of companies are
located in tracts with a population composed of less than 20% minorities.
These varying results raise several questions. Does the physical location of a
Portfolio Company matter for the social impact of the Portfolio Company on low
and moderate-income workers? How does one evaluate the impact of creating
new workplaces in the center city and high poverty communities? Does the
location of Portfolio Companies within, or outside, of low-moderate income
communities make a difference for these companies ability to retain workers? Is
77 www.ffiec.qov based off of 1990 Census data which is appropriate given time period of
investments.
78 It is interesting to note that the full 43% of other investments are made in communities with less
that 20% minority population
a census tract an appropriate level of measurement and is it the level of
measurement utilized by investors? The answers to these questions are
important both for internal measurement of the Funds' ability to achieve its
mission as well as external measurement for investors to understand the impact
of their investment. It also affects the likelihood of investments satisfying CRA
requirements. For example, BCVF, which has the majority of its Portfolio
Companies located outside of low and moderate-income census tracts, may
believe: 1) That the census tract does not appropriately represent the broader
community within which the Portfolio Company is located; and 2) The income
level of a census tract is not an appropriate measure of their primary social
impact measure, job creation 3) A more appropriate measure, given Fund
mission, is an analysis of employee residence within high poverty
neighborhoods/census tracts. To date these questions (and answers) are not
addressed. The lack of these data could lead to a misunderstanding of the
Funds' ability to address social impact within their CRA driven investors
assessment area. Conversely, MI and SVCV which both have the majority of
investments in low-moderate income and high poverty areas can utilize this to
their advantage when attracting institutional capital. Furthermore, they may also
be able to have significant social impact both through job creation as well as
through inner city commercial real estate stabilization or generation.
Number of Portfolio Companies 7
Census Tract Income Level
Low 29%
Moderate 43%
Middle 29%
Upper 0%
% below poverty in Census Tract
0-10% 29%
11-20% 29%
21-30% 14%
30-50% 0%
above 50% 29%
% Minority (includes Asian American)
0-20% 43%
21-40% 0%
41-60% 0%
61-80% 0%
81-100% 57%
Located in Center City (Yes) 71%
Table 10A
Number of Portfolio Companies 9
Census Tract Income Level
Low 33%
Moderate 33%
Middle 33%
Upper 0%
% below poverty in Census Tract
0-10% 22%
11-20% 22%
21-30% 67%
30-50% 11%
above 50% 0%
% Minority (includes Asian American)
0-20% 0%
21-40% 22%
41-60% 11%
61-80% 11%
81-100% 56%
Located in Center City (Yes) 78%
Table 10B
Number of Portfolio Companies 11
Census Tract Income Level
Low 9%
Moderate 27%
Middle 45%
Upper 18%
% below poverty in Census Tract
0-10% 64%
11-20% 9%
21-30% 18%
30-50% 9%
above 50% 0%
% Minority (includes Asian American)
0-20% 73%
21-40% 9%
41-60% 9%
61-80% 0%
81-100% 9%
Located in Center City (Yes) 55%
Table IOC
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Evaluating Social Returns
A review of both the job creation and wage criteria and well as the location
summary for the three case study Funds demonstrate that, given the evaluated
indicators and this author's methodology, Silicon Valley Community Ventures has
been the most successful in achieving social returns on investment. While it is
not possible to link these results to their social measurement infrastructure it is
integral to this thesis argument that SVCV is the only Fund that has both
established a significant measurement tool to evaluate its social impact and
created mechanisms to support the growth of social returns on investment.
SVCV has met or exceeded several of its goals and has clearly defined and
measured multiple goals, not just job creation. It is the only Fund reviewed which
provides financing to companies that, on average, have above area living wages
for their entry-level positions. SVCV has the highest job creation growth rate of
the three Funds; 67% of its companies are located in low and moderate income
census tracts; 67% of its companies are located in tracts with over 60% minority
population; 33% of the Portfolio Companies are owned by minority entrepreneurs
and given the rudimentary job creation cost matrix, SVCV seems to have the
lowest investment dollar leveraged per job created. Importantly, SVCV has done
this without adding constraints like social return contracts or quotas to their
Portfolio Companies. Comparatively, Murex Investments, which does well
investing in companies in high poverty and high minority census tracts, has a
high investment cost per jobs created/retained at its Portfolio Companies.
Additionally, employees of MI companies are likely to be at comparatively lower
wages given area minimum and living wages. Finally, BCVF, which has invested
the highest amount of capital in the most Portfolio Companies, is, given this
analysis, the least likely to invest in companies in high poverty areas; 36% of its
Portfolio Companies are within low and moderate census tracts or in minority
communities; with only 9% of companies are located in census tracts with over
60% minority populations. The Fund does, however, invest in companies whose
average entry-level wages are near area living wage and the Fund.
While this thesis does not provide directives for the nature of measurements to
be developed and implemented by funds, it does propose that the CDVC
industry, still in its developmental stages, collect this type and other of raw data
about its Portfolio Companies. Information regarding indicators such as firm
location, real estate rehabilitation or stabilization, Portfolio Company real estate
taxes, and proximity to public transit are relatively easy to gather (given both the
public nature of most of this information as well as small investment portfolio) and
would provide base data from which to evaluate and then use as new
measurements are created. This type of analysis can be used to deepen the
social impact analysis that exists around CDVCs and ultimately assist the
industry in creating a more effective investment model.
Recommendations
Measuring the social impact of Community Development Venture Capital funds
makes sense given the double bottom line approach to investing of the CDVC
industry. Much of the discussion around CDVC's has been in trying to create the
appropriate business practices to achieve financial returns, and to persuade
investors that these financial returns are rational and reasonable. Yet, the social
impact of these Funds is still unproven. If this industry is truly a double
measurement of financial and social impact then proper attention must be paid to
both the indicators and measurement of social returns. A CDCVA report,
"Measuring Social Returns in CDVC"79 takes an initial look at the ways that
several Funds measure social returns and the complexities of understanding and
implementing these measures. The report focuses most of its analysis on job
creation since it is the primary indicator Funds use for social returns. The article
speaks to several ongoing challenges faced in the measurement of social impact.
First, how does a Fund ascertain that their investment created a job, and does
any job that is created post-investment qualify as one the Fund created? These
are a particularly acute question to understand in light of many Funds' move
7 Schmitt, Brian T. 2001: "Measuring Social returns in Community Development Venture Capital"
unpublished report sponsored by the Rockefeller and Hewlett Foundations, May 1, 2001.
towards increased co-investment or investment through a hybrid strategy that
places CDVCs alongside or in competition with other Venture Capital funds. If a
Fund co-invests, would another type of venture capitalist (SBIC/SSBIC) have
invested; and if so, to what degree is the CDVC providing new access to capital?
A second related issue that is highlighted in the Report looks at the nature of
equity as a longer-term investment. Is it appropriate to evaluate Funds' ability to
achieve social returns in the short run when equity investment has a five to ten
year lifetime? This question, while reasonable, can be accounted for. CDVC
Funds can evaluate social returns on similar timelines. So, by collecting good
data along the life of an investment, an organization would be able to measure
the social returns of the Fund in a manner, which respects the investment cycle.
It could evaluate social returns when determining follow-on investments, during
the course of engagement as the Fund makes managerial/operational changes
and finally look at social returns at exit. This way the Fund's social retums are
constantly aligned with the financial returns. It also would require an assessment
of the ultimate benefit of the investment, so for example, if a Fund 'created' 100
jobs through an investment by year five, but in year eight when exit occurs, the
Portfolio Company reduced staff resulting in the Fund's creation/retention of fifty
jobs; those fifty jobs would be the ultimate job creation return measure.
CDVC's, however, do not have an established social returns model to follow.
Some, like SVCV, are creating these models in relative solitude. The work of
creating and implementing a new measurement methodology is complex. The
apparent complexity is further exacerbated by the fact that the CDVC industry
has still not defined itself. Its organizations have a varied set of goals and
missions, they are at various stages of development, and new types and sizes of
CDVC Funds are constantly appearing. To this end, industry experts have made
comments that, "the field of CDVC is too young to begin to codify its social return
measures".80 I contend, however, that this is the time for individual Funds and the
industry overall to address the social return measurement of CDVC. The double
bottom line investment strategy requires that Funds examine their social returns,
with equal rigor as the measurement of financial returns. Not to do this negates
the idea of a double bottom line, and perhaps as one observer put it, "makes
social returns one input into the financial bottom line, but not its own or
equivalent bottom line."81 Utilizing the Venture Capital model as the method of
equity investment provides already established tools to measure the financial
returns of CDVC's. Now is the appropriate time to develop more comprehensive
social returns measures for several reasons:
1. The industry is young, and relatively small. There are only about sixty Funds
total in the US and twenty-five equity-focused Funds. These Funds have
invested in a total of 162 Portfolio Companies invested in. This indicates that
on average each Fund has 6.5 Portfolio Companies. The small and
manageable nature of the Fund-Portfolio Company relationship may be more
conducive to experimenting with and implementing social measurement
apparatus. The current measures seem to be unevenly administered and
limited in scope.
2. The CDVC industry is growing, both in the number of Funds as well as the
capitalization of Funds. Most organizations that are raising second Funds are
significantly increasing the capitalization of those Funds. For the three Funds
in this study, their Fund I's will be between 120% and 300% greater than
Fund l's. This increase in capital indicates a greater devotion of community
development dollars (investments that would have been utilized for some
other broadly defined community development activity) to CDVC's. The
process of understanding how, and how much, these funds leverage
'community development dollars' to create actual community development is
key to making resource allocation decisions.
3. The CDVCA is growing both in membership and capacity. It has recently
hired a full time researcher. CDVCA could play a critical role in creating and
helping to implement social measurement strategies. It can also act as a
clearinghouse for best practices in social measurement, and promote these
findings through its various publications and events.
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80 Ibid.
81 Interview by Author April 2002.
4. There is an implicit argument that all Venture Capital activity creates
employment. In fact, the traditional Venture Capital industry cites that it
created four million jobs through venture backed companies in the year 2000
alone. The claim of the CDVC industry is that they create particular types of
jobs, for certain underserved workers as well as a host of other social impact
criteria. Yet, these social returns are not well defined nor measured. The
CDVC industry must define how they add more value, both to investors who
may look for traditional Venture Capital financial returns as well as investors
who look for high social returns.
5. Development and utilization of comprehensive social returns measurements
will allow individual Funds and the CDVC industry to evaluate, replicate and
innovate the model to increase both facets of the double bottom line.
Next Steps
While it is recognized that CDVC Funds have various social return measures and
weigh even similar measure differently there is evidence of industry wide
indicators beyond the obvious measures of job creation that will deepen the
understanding and ultimately the impact of CDVCs. Looking back to chapter two,
there were several social impact indicators common to all three Funds.
Job Creation and Living Wages
The types of data presented in this thesis and the significant measurement tools
developed and utilized by SVCV are indicators of how these returns can be
measured. While most Funds currently measure job creation/retention rates
among their companies, they measure this social impact indicator with a varying
degree of rigor. For this measure to be meaningful there must be an increased
attention paid to differentiating created and retained jobs, a fair assessment of
jobs created given co-investments, an evaluation of net jobs that takes lay-offs,
resignations and terminations into account and a clear delineation that the jobs
created are filled by low income workers. Funds also speak to the creation of
good jobs. One relatively simple proxy for this can be benefits/wages analysis.
An evaluation of living wage jobs created or available at a company given
internal job training and the amount of workers who receive a living wage and
some basic benefits will provide another way for Funds to evaluate their ability to
84
create good jobs. Evaluation and assistance in establishing links between
Portfolio Companies and job training/placement agencies working with Low
income communities can also be a valid measurement tool. This type of
evaluation will a help to inform Funds about the types of investments that
translate into higher wage positions and better evaluate the companies, sectors
and stages of investment that result in these better jobs. Further, it will allow
Funds to compare the impact they can make relative to other investments.
An evaluation of employee wages prior to working at a Portfolio Company may
provide real indicators of poverty level pre/post employment or use of public
assistance or multiple jobs to supplement income. Requiring wage information
for prior employment is a relatively standard business practice and would provide
vital information about poverty alleviation.
Urban Focus
An analysis of the degree to which an urban/regional Fund is affecting an urban
core can also deepen social impact. First, to what degree is the Fund maintaining
its urban focus, and to what degree is that an expectation of funders? As noted
above, some funders are concentrating investment in urban Funds and many
Banks have specific focus areas for CRA related investments. A GIS exercise
can provide some of this initial information, as well as a review of CRA qualified
investment areas. A second and more well rounded analysis would include an
evaluation of employee residences, again given GIS systems an easy test to see
if employees, at the time of employment reside in high poverty urban
communities. Further analysis could review the types of public transportation
and supportive services that enable workers from these areas to conventionally
work at Portfolio Companies that may or may not be located in high poverty
communities. This can be accomplished in such a way that does not provide
disincentives for companies to expand or for employees to move into higher
income neighborhoods. For example, if an employee lives in a high poverty
neighborhood at the time of employment and after two years lives in a higher
income neighborhood, that could perhaps be seen as a positive externality of
employment with the Portfolio Company. Another possibility could be a Company
located in a CRA eligible census tract at the time of investment which, by exit ,no
longer qualifies because its surrounds have had considerable investment may
represent a positive externality of investment.
Entrepreneurial Growth
A measurement of entrepreneurial growth was also commonly cited as a social
returns indicator. It is suggested that, "one good proxy [for entrepreneurial
capacity] is deal flow".8 Another possibility is measuring the degree to which
CDVCs' investment in entrepreneurs in under-invested categories. This may
include, specific sectors; like environmentally sustainable businesses or
manufacturing; particular areas; like high poverty urban or rural communities; or
certain populations; namely women and people of color. If, for instance, CDVC's
were able to, where traditional VC's focus 80% of their investments in high tech,
invest successful in environmentally sustainable businesses or, where only 2% of
traditional Venture Capital is directed toward people of color, direct higher
amounts to minorities; they could establish a competitive advantage of
successful investment in an untapped market and further provide access to
capital among under-served constituencies. Additionally, an assessment of the
allocation of investment to non traditional businesses/business owners may
provide one proxy for interpreting how CDVCs provide access to capital that
encourages new entrants into entrepreneurship.
Stability and/or Development in High Poverty Areas
A final social return measure could be the physical impact of investment. Areas
for further development are indicated by the location analysis in this thesis.
Funds can assess the location of their Portfolio Companies in many ways to
begin to understand impact. Retained or increased property taxes in high
poverty areas is another potential positive externality of Portfolio Company
" Ibid.
investment, an ongoing assessment of company property taxes can enhance the
depth of CDVC impact. The degree to which Portfolio Company real estate
construction or revitalization acts as a catalyst for infrastructure or real estate
development is another opportunity to evaluate the impact of CDVCs. This can
be a difficult measure to exact, however some opportunities can be a longitudinal
analysis of development which evaluates trends in development prior and post
Portfolio Company real estate development. A final analysis could appraise the
multiplier effects of Portfolio Companies, analysis could include mapping of the
supply chain of the company to evaluate its impact on local suppliers/purchasers.
CDVCs can include the development of implementation strategies to help
Portfolio Companies effectively support these local businesses, expanding
CDVCs influence over local markets.
CDVC Funds are entrepreneurial, view their work as innovative and attempt to
reduce the constraints within which they work. The assumptions of financial
measurements of success are not seen as a limitation yet the incorporation of
social measurement is. Social return measurements can be flexible and
inventive. They can take into account the individuality of each Fund, yet still
allow the industry to self regulate, and ensure that Funds who claim to be CDVCs
share a certain principle in common. It may not be the specific goals they
measure but rather that the measurement, evaluation and support of social
returns are seen as vital to a Funds ability to succeed. Funds have a
responsibility to be as actively engaged in appraising the social returns of their
Funds as they are in valuing their financial returns. A traditional VC's reputation
is doing 'whatever it takes' to achieve financial returns' to be constantly engaged
with its Portfolio Companies to ensure that the returns required are met. CDVCS
must act with the same energy on both inputs into their bottom line. It is the
opinion of this author that an approach to Portfolio Company management that
does not actively support the attainment of social returns, but rather relies on
market forces to shape social return outcomes among its investments, is limiting
the potential effects and viability of this community development investment tool.
Venture capitalists promote, advise and sometimes dictate particular
managerial/operational practices of their companies. CDVCs can add significant
value by working to create and implement business practices that sustainably
and profitably support good quality jobs for low-income people in distressed or
underserved markets.
There are opportunities for investors to participate in the social goals of their
CDVC Fund's, without over-stepping the Limited Partner boundaries. First banks,
if they utilize CRA designated capital to fund CDVCs, should negotiate some
agreed upon portion of the CDVCs investment are located and/or considerable
persons reside at time of employment in CRA eligible census tracts. For financial
institutions to ignore these basic requirements of their investments dismisses the
intention of CRA to target capital in spaces that are under-served and should be
a fundamental and better monitored requirement of CRA eligible capital. Second,
as investors make Fund 11 investments and review the CDVC's track record,
social indicators should be equally weighed with the real/expected financial
returns in an investor's analysis of management's experience. There may also be
a role for information sharing or grant assistance, particularly among foundations,
to assist Funds in the development and measurement of social impact tools.
However, It is the Funds' responsibility, given the pressures by investors to
increase financial returns, to confirm that they are distinct, they value equally the
financial and social returns on investment and they expect their investors to
share those values.
There is also a role for CDVCA to play in establishing and promoting the
implementation of social impact measures that are common among Funds. As
noted above it is critical that this is done while the industry is still relatively young.
It sets the stage for Funds, current and future, to incorporate social returns
measurements as part of the central structure of their organizations. It is clear
that CDVCA has begun to research, evaluate and monitor the social returns of
CDVCs; it can continue and expand this work. It can also act as a voice to
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investors, particularly banks or new entrants into CDVC funder pool, to maintain
alignment between CDVCs dual outcome approach and their expectations as a
Limited Partner. Finally, CDVCA can provide technical assistance and/or grants
to Funds to help develop and implement tools that will deepen the industry's
understanding of social impact and spur innovation to further hone CDVCs' ability
to meet the their mission.
Conclusion
The study of Community Development Venture Capital is important to
understanding urban economic development. First, economic development
strategies have and continue to focus on business development. Community
Development Venture Capital represents a unique method of introducing equity
capital to businesses that may otherwise not receive or have access to equity.
These companies often locate in and/or employ residents of low-income urban
areas. Second, Community Development Venture Capital proposes to
incorporate both a financial and social bottom line. Because of this dual
approach to investing, CDVC Funds have access to a variety of funding sources;
these investors often represent pools of capital that would otherwise be directed
to some other community/economic development benefit. Finally, as extensively
documented, urban high poverty areas have been losing businesses to suburban
areas for a long time in the US, and activities that encourage development of
inner city business that employ low income/low skilled inner city residents may be
able to play a key role as a catalyst in encouraging the return of good paying jobs
into the inner city.
This thesis explored two related questions. First, how do investors in CDVC
Funds influence the type of investments the CDVC Funds make and do these
influences impact overall social returns? Second, what are the type,
comprehensiveness and results of current social return measures in the CDVC
industry? These two issues are related in a very distinct and powerful way; to be
able to respond to the pressure of increased expected financial returns, Funds'
must be able to show the value of their social returns.
It has been shown through this thesis, by examining three Funds' changing
investors and investment strategies, that the industry is undergoing considerable
restructuring. Concrete strategic changes have been made in Fund Ils for all
three CDVCs. These changes can be attributed to several factors: overall Fund
experience, industry growth and changing market conditions. However, I propose
that a factor in the changes is also result of the shifting nature of Fund investors.
As chapter three illustrates there is a trend toward increased pension, large
foundation and federal government involvement in CDVCs. Additionally,
increased bank participation, spurred by CRA credit given for CDVC investments.
This is a movement away from local foundations, local government and
individuals. These changes have, in part, affected Fund capitalization. Funds are
moving towards higher capitalization to address both the high cost of operations
and because these new players have higher levels of capital to invest. The
higher capitalization in turn creates a need for higher investment levels, which
affects the type, nature and stage of businesses that become Portfolio
Companies.
These trends have various potential effects on the CDVC industry; significantly
there is the trend toward increased prominence placed on the financial returns of
CDVCs. Given this, the measures and results of the social returns of CDVC
Funds are key to understand. Currently, Funds have industry-wide inconsistent
evaluations techniques, or simplified social measures, focused primarily on
anecdotal evidence or loosely concentrating on job creation as the sole
systematically monitored indicator of social impact success. All of these factors
decrease the effectiveness of the Funds, the industry and ultimately the ability to
attract aligned funding. Funds are changing strategies, like the move toward
hybrid investing, in a response to investor pressures. A stronger position for the
industry would be to establish their investor criteria that values, as they do, social
and financial returns equally. To do this they must be able to explicitly
understand and convey the types of social impact that their Funds have on
targeted communities. Simply counting up the number of jobs created cannot do
this. This does not appropriately speak to the mission of the Funds, and places
undue limitations on what the impacts of CDVCs are and can be. Silicon Valley
Community Ventures has established a social return measurement that takes
into account multiple factors such as job creation and retention, living wage
standards, benefits, and location impact among other criteria. SVCVs systems do
not set specific requirements on its Funds and represents a direction that the
industry pursue.
The movement of Funds toward this more comprehensive approach to
measurement with CDVCA's support will position Funds to align their investors
with their outcomes ultimately creating a system of similar effectiveness to the
traditional VC. In traditional Venture Capital, Limited Partners and General
Partners motivations are aligned to provide the highest financial returns possible.
When CDVCs are able to articulate and document the full range of their impact,
financial and social, they too will be able to align their motivations with investors
who understand and support both inputs in the double bottom line.
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APPENDIX 1
Community Development Venture Capital Investor Survey
Name of Institution - --
Type of Bank r Foundation Government Agency PensionInstitution r7r
Fund Insurance Co. Other
CDVC Funds Invested Fund 1
CDVC Funds Invested in Fund 2 ..  .......
CDVC Funds Invested in Fund 31
Number of Rounds Invested in each fund Fund 1
Number of Rounds Invested in each fund Fund 2
Number of Rounds Invested in each fund Fund 31
Amount of Total Investments
Type of Investment (choose all that apply)
Equity
Debt
Other
Given investment type what are expected returns? (e.g. 15% return on equity, 5%
interest rate on debt)
Qualifying investment program (choose all that apply)
El part 24
1CRA
EPRI
Other
Primary reason(s) for investment (please choose a MAXIMUM of two)
satisfies CRA/part 24
attractive potential financial return
fulfills primary mission of organization
diversification of investments
strength of CDVC management team
other
How did you weigh the financial and social objectives of the Fund in your initial
investment decision?
solely financial 1 equally financial and social solely social
If the investment decision was based with consideration to the social goals of the CDVC
Fund which social mission was most closely aligned with your organizations reasons for
investment?
growth of minority business ownership
growth of women business ownership
growth of environmentally sound businesses
increased employment opportunities for low income/low skilled labor
increase in businesses located in the inner city
What methods are used to gather information about your investment? (check all that
apply)
quarterly/annual reports
seat on investment committee
visits/communication with portfolio companies
other
Do you believe the investments made by the CDVC are fulfilling their social mission?
always
mostly
sometimes
rarely
never
I don't know
Do you believe that the CDVC investment(s) made by your institution have?
met expected social goals exceeded expected social goals L fallen short of
expected social goals
Do you believe that the CDVC investment(s) your institution has made have
met expected financial goals exceeded expected financial goals fallen short
of expected financial goals
If your investment qualified under CRA/part 24: What percentage of your annual CRA
investment did the CDVC Fund investment represent that fiscal year?
Would your organization consider investing in a CDVC Fund again? yes
probably 7 doubtful L no
Please provide any additional comments that you think may be important in
understanding why your organizations has chosen to invest in Community Development
Venture Capital Funds.
Powered by
APPENDIX 2
Surveys
Responded
Complete
Bank Respondants
Foundation Respondants
Total Number of Funds Invested in*
Total Amount of Capital Invested* $ 207750000
Debt 1
Equity 8
Both 1
0-1% 1
1.1-5% 2
5.1-10% 2
10.1-15% 2
15.1-20% 2
over 20% 1
CRA 5
part 24 3
PRI 2
Other 0
Satisifies CRA/part 24 5
Attractive Potential Financial Return 1
Fulfills Primary Mission of the Organization 4
Diversification of Investments I
Strength of CDVC Management Team 0
Other 1
equally social and financial 9
solely social 1
soley financial 0
growth of minority business ownership 3
growth of women business ownership 1
growth of environmentally sound businesses 0
increased employment opportunities for low income/low skilled labor 4
increase in businesses located in the inner city 2
Quarterly/Annual Reports 9
Seat on Investment Committee/Advisory Board 3
Visits to Portfolio Companies 3
Other 0
always 1
mostly 6
sometimes 0
rarely 0
never 0
1 don't know 3
met expected social goals 8
exceeded expected social goals 1
fallen short of expected social goals 1
met expected financial goals 3
exceeded expected financial goals 0
fallen short of expected financial goals 1
NA-* 6
2.5% 1
less than 5% 2
three year average 26% 1
don't know 1
Yes 9
Probably 1
Doubtful 0
No 0
skewed by two respondants that include SBIC/SSBIC investments with CDVC investments
** in commments section organizations stated they were unable to make a determination on financial returns yet
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APPENDIX 3
THESIS INTERVIEW LIST
Elyse Cherry
CEO and founder
Boston Community Capital
March 2002
Andrew Chen
Sr Fund Manager,
Boston Community Venture Fund
March 2002
Michelle Haigh
Analyst,
Sustainable Jobs Fund
March 2002
Dick Jones
CFO and founder
Boston Community Capital
February 2002
Kevin Jordan
VP, Urban Investment Group
Goldman and Sachs
March 2002
Josh Lerner
Professor
Harvard Business School
Author: The Venture Capital Cycle
The Money of Innovation
January 2002
Pete November
Director Business Advisory Services
Silicon Valley Community Ventures
March 2002
Community Development Division
Bank of America
February 2002
Julia Sass Rubin
Post Doctorate
Harvard Business School
Brian Schmitt
Research Officer
Community Development Venture
Capital Alliance
March 2002
Community Development Finance
First Union Corporation
March 2002
Trevor Smith
Portfolio Manager
Silicon Valley Community Ventures
March 2002
Joel Steiker
Sr. Fund Manager
Murex Investments
March 2002
Beth Lipson
Manager, Special Projects and
Financial Services
National Community Capital
April 2002
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APPENDIX 4
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR CDVC FUNDS
Questions Regarding Investors/CRA Requirements
1. Who are your investors and how much did each investor commit to your fund?
(note I have partial list of investors, any additional?)
2. How do you believe the investment objectives of these varying investors differ?
How do you believe your investors weigh the financial and social objectives of
their investment?
3. How have investor's objectives influenced the CDVC Funds investments goals
and strategy?
4. Have you seen/or do you see a potential for conflict arising from having investors
with differing objectives? How have these conflicts been managed? (vs. VC's
whose investors primarily have the same motivation- profit maximization).
5. What is the role of Banks as investors in CDVC's and do you see it changing?
6. Have you made any specific commitment to your investors to meet certain social
or financial goals? What are those commitments? How have those commitments
affected the types of businesses you invest in?
7. Are you familiar with the CRA/part 24 requirements for financial institutions? Do
you believe that the mission of your fund qualifies as satisfying the intentions of
CRA?
8. Do you know whether any of your investors have utilized their investment as a
satisfaction of their CRA requirements? Do you know what percentage of their
CRA funds are invested in your Fund?
9. Have the requirements of the CRA affected the types of businesses you invest
in? Do you believe that all of the businesses you invest satisfy CRA req's?
10. Do you plan to raise a second fund? If so, what investors to you hope to target
for fundraising, why? If already raised/raising fund 2- what are investors' criteria
for investment? How does this differ from their criteria in Fund I investments?
11. What type of ongoing reporting do you make to your investors? How do you
report social returns?
12. What returns have your investors earned to date, financial/social? What
percentage of the financial returns has been distributed? In what form are
financial returns distributed?
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Questions Regarding Impact Of Fund On Inner-City Revitalization
1. How do you measure the impact of your investments on the economic
development of your target area? (qualitative and quantitative measures)
2. Do you know if any of the businesses you have invested in have utilized
previously abandoned/vacant real estate in high poverty urban areas? If so,
where, how many, course of reintegration into real estate market?
3. How do you find your portfolio companies?
4. What types of connections do you have with local economic development/SBA/
agencies? Have these connections helped identify potential portfolio companies?
5. What is the total number of FTE's at your portfolio company? How many are
newly created jobs since your fund's investment in the company?
6. What number of the jobs that have been created by portfolio companies have
gone to low-income residents of high poverty urban areas?
7. What number of the jobs that have been created by portfolio companies are
located within high poverty urban areas?
8. Have you ever experienced a company whose bottom line would be positively
affected by re-locating outside of the inner city? How do you (would you) handle
this in relation to your social and financial missions?
9. The traditional VC industry is focused on the management team, and will often
bring in new management if they feel the current team is ineffective, have you
been in that situation? How was that handled?
10. Have there been any difficulties focusing on an urban marketplace? Are their
factors which may/are pulling you away from concentrating investments in _?
11. What do you believe are the key obstacles to investing in companies that are
located in or willing to locate in the inner city? How has your fund attempted to
overcome these challenges?
12. What type of growth do you see for your organization?
13. What do you believe is your organization's current role and impact in affecting
economic development change in the inner city of ?
14. Are their aspects unique to your fund, or general industry practices that you
believe would be helpful to know when attempting to understand CDVC's
potential impact on inner city neighborhoods?
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